The plot thickens

Dubai's chief of police has launched another attack on the Muslim Brotherhood, though with little obvious public reaction, writes Doaa El-Bey

Dubai chief of police Dahi Khalfan warned this week of what he called an "international plot" to overthrow the governments of the Arab Gulf countries, saying that the region needs to be prepared to counter any threats from Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers as well as Syria and Iran.

"There's an international plot against the Gulf states in particular and Arab countries in general," Khalfan told reporters at a gathering in Dubai late last week marking the holy month of Ramadan. "This is pre-planned to take over our fortunes."

"The Muslim Brothers and the governments in Damascus and North Africa have to know that the Gulf is a red line, not only for Iran but also for the Brothers as well," he added.

According to one diplomat, who spoke under condition of anonymity, Khalfan's attack on the Brotherhood has not been his first and it reflects Gulf fears that the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world may pose a serious threat to their countries' governments.

"Gulf officials are concerned that the rise of Islamists in the wake of the Arab Spring could stir up Islamist groups and arouse dissent in their own countries," the diplomat said, explaining the arrests of Islamists that have been taking place in the United Arab Emirates in recent months.

Khalfan's statement came one day after eight Islamists were detained, bringing the total number of those detained since April to at least 20. The arrests came as part of a clampdown in the UAE on those suspected of having links with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Most of the detained are believed to be linked to Al-Islah, an outlawed Islamist group in the UAE that apparently shares goals with the Muslim Brotherhood but is not specifically linked to it.

The detained men had been calling for greater civil rights and more power to be given to the UAE's Federal National Council, a quasi-parliamentary body that advises the government but has no legislative power.

Unlike Khalfan's previous attacks on the Brotherhood, this one brought few reactions from the group. Brotherhood spokesman Mahmoud Ghozlan dismissed the comments, saying that they did not deserve a reaction.

However, similar comments made by Khalfan on Twitter earlier this month did prompt a strong reaction. After the election of Mohamed Mursi as Egyptian president, Khalfan had written on his Twitter account that Mursi "will kiss the hands of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques [the king of Saudi Arabia], just as [Brotherhood founder] Hassan El-Banna did with king Abdel-Aziz."

The tweet, causing anger in Egypt, was later removed from Khalfan's account, though he also described Mursi's election as "an unfortunate choice" for Egypt.

Khalfan's earlier comments triggered official reactions in Cairo and Dubai, with Egypt's Foreign Ministry summoning UAE Ambassador to Egypt Mohamed bin Nakhira to demand an explanation.

UAE Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Al-Hidan arrived in Cairo after Khalfan's comments to defuse tensions between Egypt and the UAE following the statements, and Brotherhood leaders met in the same week to discuss legal steps that could be initiated in response to Khalfan's comments.

Khalfan claimed that he had received more than 1,500 threats from supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in response to his criticism of the group.

He has a history of clashing with the group, since earlier this year Khalfan said he would order the arrest of Youssef El-Qaradawi, head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, should he attempt to enter the UAE.

The statement followed El-Qaradawi's criticisms of the UAE government for deporting Syrians who had protested against the regime in Damascus in front of the Syrian embassy in Abu Dhabi.

Ghozlan said that the UAE would "face the anger of the entire Arab and Muslim world" if El-Qaradawi were arrested, though the Egyptian Foreign Ministry subsequently issued a statement clarifying Ghozlan's remarks and saying that he had been misquoted.

Khalfan's comments, followed by the reactions of the Brotherhood, have raised concerns among Egyptians living in the Gulf, and especially in the UAE, since some have already been facing difficulties renewing work permits and visas.

Officials worry that what could become a war of words between the two countries could negatively affect economic relations.

According to Azza, an Egyptian housewife who has lived in Dubai for the past decade, Egyptians living in the UAE do not have problems with the authorities there.

However, strong statements from an official as influential and outspoken as Khalfan have raised fears among Egyptians about their status. "The statements' impact could be temporary. I am not sure that they will have a real and permanent impact," Azza said.

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Intra-regional remittances: Our tooth fairy

Florence Eid presents an overview on how remittances to Egypt and the MENA region will fare over the coming year

Remittances are a critical source of income in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Particularly among oil importers, remittances tend to support investment and private sector activity, boosting the recipient country's external positions. Overall, decreased unrest across the region and the continued expansion in the region's oil exporters should pave the way for increased remittance inflows to the region's oil importers. In fact, Saudi Arabia is one of the world's top 10 employers of expatriate workers, and continued government spending in the kingdom is likely to reflect in increased remittance inflows across the region's oil importers in the short to medium term. In the long term, however, prioritising "Saudisation" could lead to a drop in the amount of expatriates currently representing 60 per cent of the Saudi labour force.

The World Bank places Egypt as one of the world's top 10 recipients of remittances, as inflows defied expectations and remained strong in 2011 and the first half of 2012, despite the slowdown in the global economy and the return of a significant number of workers from Libya.

Latest statistics point to a 36.2 per cent year-on-year (Y/Y) deterioration of the current account deficit in the first three quarters of the fiscal year 2011/2012 to $6.4 billion from $4.7 billion. Remittances over the same period, however, increased by almost 44 per cent to circa $12.8 billion. The receipt of almost $400 million of remittances from workers employed in Iraq in the 1990s in the first half of 2012 helped improve Egypt's deteriorating balance of payment (BoP) position. This is roughly 10 per cent of total remittances in the first quarter of 2012. Second quarter 2012 data is yet to be released. This is part of a recent trend across MENA whereby remittance inflows across the region increased by almost six per cent in the first quarter of 2012, with the majority originating from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

More than half of Egypt's remittances come from Asia, particularly the GCC. Continued increases in social spending as well as infrastructure investments in the GCC should sustain the momentum of remittance inflows to Egypt at least into 2013. Most Egyptian expatriates in the GCC reside in Saudi Arabia, and government expenditure in the kingdom should remain in an expansionary mode at least for the next two fiscal years. The gradual improvement of economic conditions in Libya should re-open the market to Egyptian workers in FY 2012/2013, further boosting inflows.

Our forward projection of data indicates that remittances, along with multilateral assistance, could be vital pillars on which Egypt can rely to provide much-needed relief to its balance of payments position. Preliminary data indicates that FY 2011/2012 saw the highest-ever level of remittances in Egypt; almost double levels seen at the top of the market (2007).

We project forward the average yearly growth of remittances since the financial crisis of 2008 (around 27 per cent) and among the results are remittance inflows above $25 billion for FY 2013/14.

We believe the assumptions are reasonable: upside risks to our remittance forecast include the eventual return of one to 1.5 million Egyptian workers to Libya, and sustained economic activity in the GCC. Downside pressures, including the slowdown in the Eurozone and North America, are less significant, as Europe accounts for less than 15 per cent of remittance inflows for Egypt.

Efforts by various ministries to encourage expatriates to invest in Egypt, and increase their private transfers, should also contribute to this trend. An improvement in remittance inflows could also provide much needed support to international reserves. This could, in turn, help finance Egypt's funding gap, estimated at $12 billion in FY 2012/2013.

Further incentives to boost the inflow of remittances could also have spillover effects on different sectors of the economy. Should remittances be used towards land purchases or the support of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), both investment and infrastructure activity could increase. Though remittance levels are broadly independent of political stability in the recipient country, decreased political uncertainty remains critical if investment-linked inflows are to continue growing in the next two years.

The slowdown in the Eurozone should continue to adversely affect tourism flows and remittances to North Africa, especially in Morocco. In the past two years, roughly half of the country's 800,000 migrants who work in Spain, and a third of those working in Italy, lost their jobs. This could also further the impact on the stock market, as investments by non-resident Moroccans account for around 30 per cent of the market value of the Casablanca Stock Exchange.

In Tunisia, the return of workers from Libya increased the official unemployment rate from 13 per cent in May 2010 to 18.3 per cent in May 2011. Recovery in Libya, however, could see a sizeable proportion of workers returning there, with positive effects on remittance inflows to Tunisia. Though Tunisia has recently granted freedom of movement, employment, ownership and investment to Maghreb nationals (excluding Libya), the decision is unlikely to be reciprocated by Algeria, particularly in the immediate future.

Lebanon is another important recipient of remittances, particularly from GCC countries and North America, averaging almost 20 per cent of GDP, the highest in the region. Remittance inflows defied expectations and remained stable in 2011 at around $7.6 billion according to the World Bank. The balance of payments deficit, on the other hand, expanded to reach $916.1 million over the period January-April 2012 relative to $597.8 million in 2011 -- a 53.2 per cent deterioration Y/Y.

After declining by 5.2 per cent in 2011, the level of remittances in Jordan recovered in the first half of 2012, reaching 978 million Jordanian Dinars (JD) over the period January-May 2012 relative to JD 922.6 million over the same period last year -- a six per cent increase. Decreased unrest across the MENA region (for example in Syria) should contribute to a further improvement in remittance inflows into Jordan, especially those used for real estate investments in the country.

Continued growth and social spending in GCC countries, in Iraq, as well as in Libya should increase remittance inflows to the region's oil importers, especially in North Africa. But political stability in recipient countries will be central to maximising the proportion of such inflows going towards investment activities.

The writer is founder and CEO of Arabia Monitor. The study was co-authored with economists Ayah El-Said and Said Benmehidi.

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The tale of an unusual dancer

Osama Kamal has been watching the TV dramatisation of the life of Tahia Karioka Actress Wafaa Amer personifying Karioka's life in a Ramadan series;
Dancer and actress Karioka

Dramatising biographies is not always easy. This is especially true when the memories are still fresh in the minds of the living, as the current television series about the life of Tahia Karioka, Egypt's Oriental dance icon, amply demonstrates.

Ever since Promo Media, the show's production company, announced its intention of televising a serial, entitled Karioka, about the life of Karioka, who died in 1999, a steady stream of acrimonious statements has been released by the company and heirs of the dancer. At one point Karioka's family filed a lawsuit to prevent the serial from going on air, claiming that the artist's life was grossly misrepresented. Some say, however, that the dispute is primarily financial in the sense that the family does not believe it was appropriately compensated for the dramatisation of the late artist's life.

The series tells the story of Tahia Karioka's unusual career. Born in 1915, she ran away from her family home in Ismailia to seek an art career in the capital. Luckily for her she met Soad Mahasen, a dancer and singer who knew the legendary dancer and cabaret owner Badia Masabni. Masabni admired Karioka's feisty personality, and gave the dancer her debut at her famous nightclub in 1936.

Masabni also encouraged Karioka to try new dance styles. The young dancer soon copied a Brazilian folk song by the name of "Carioca" with such success that the name of the dance stuck with her for the rest of her life.

It was at about this time that Karioka met Seliman Naguib, a great actor who helped her with her art and coached her on the ways of the big city.

The dramatisation opened with Karioka still at home, and having a rough time dealing with her family. Some of the details in the script have been disputed by Karioka's family, especially those about her half-brother tying her with chains and shaving her head by way of punishment. The script writers based this episode in her life on Karioka's memoirs and her interviews with Al-Kawakib editor Hassan Imam Omar and the dramatist Saleh Morsi.

Karioka did not shy away from the media. When the distinguished Palestinian writer Edward Said interviewed her in 1989, he compared her to other icons of Egyptian liberalism such as Taha Hussein, Naguib Mahfouz, Umm Kalthoum and Mohamed Abdel-Wahab.

In the television drama, it is 1955 and Karioka is reminiscing in prison, where she was held in detention on charges of belonging to an underground leftist organisation. She remembers her journey from Ismailia to Emadeddin Street.

The show's director, Omar El-Sheikh, shot most of the series indoors, venturing outdoors only briefly. The outstanding sets are designed by Sherine Farghal, and they and the costumes by Samia Abdel-Aziz truly conjure the 1920s, 30s and 40s during which the early part of the series takes place. The musical score by Radwan Nasri resonates with the hardship and determination marking the early years of the artist's career.

However Alaa Morsi, cast in the role of the opportunistic and sadistic half-brother, appears to be too literal in his interpretation of the character. Alyaa Assaf, in the role of young Karioka, offers a convincing and understated performance. Fadia Abdel-Ghani's rendering of the ageing Masabni brings to life the kindness and natural charisma of someone with legendary fame and profound humanity.

Wafaa Amer plays the grown-up Karioka, but her part in the series is just beginning so it will be interesting to see how well she develops in one of the most challenging roles of her career.

Karioka is one of the outstanding personalities of the last century. Her distinguished acting and singing career is only part of her legacy. It is said that she single-handedly turned Oriental dance from an erotic act into an art of the utmost sophistication. Many admirers recall with admiration her leftist politics and her involvement in the defence of artists' rights, while others will remember her fiery temper, her sweet smile, her many marriages and her interminable optimism.

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Discomfort in Ankara

Amid reports of US activity in southeastern Anatolia and discontent among Turkey's Kurds, the government in Ankara has been fighting to keep up with events, writes Sayed Abdel-Maguid in Ankara

One of the Syrian regime's latest vituperations against Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been to describe him as a "damned Ottoman Seljuk who's plotting to restore the caliphate," though Erdogan himself has been unruffled by the curses as he presses ahead with his goal of toppling the Al-Assad regime.

In this aim, Erdogan has the support of influential Arab parties that have opened their coffers to help arm the Syrian opposition and the backing of the US. Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition has been gaining ground in the Syrian capital Damascus and elsewhere in the country, enjoying the fruit of better funding, equipment and logistical and other support.

According to reports in the Turkish press, the US embassy in Ankara, in coordination with the consulate in Adana in southeast Anatolia, has been planning military operations against the Baathist regime in Syria with the knowledge of the Turkish government.

Citing reports in the French magazine l'Express, Turkish newspapers say that large numbers of trucks have been coming out of the long-inactive Incirlik military base laden with arms for distribution among factions of the Syrian opposition in the border zones.

US ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone also recently attended a secret meeting in the Adana consulate, at which consul Daria Darnell briefed participants on the progress of military operations in Syria and the latest developments.

On 30 July, Aydynlyk, a Turkish opposition daily, said that the Obama administration was trying to convince Turkish public opinion that Turkish forces should enter Syria in order to retaliate against the downing of the Turkish F-4 reconnaissance plane by Syrian missiles in June.

There has been a certain irony in holding such meetings in Adana, since 14 years ago it was the venue for a landmark reconciliation between the regime of Hafez Al-Assad, the present Syrian president's father, and the secularist rulers in Ankara.

Today, the town has become a staging post for toppling the regime of Al-Assad's successor at the hands of the neo-Islamists who have been in power Turkey for the last decade.

Events have been moving quickly, with the result that it has been difficult to predict what the next day, or hour, will bring. In Ankara, the government has been closely monitoring developments in Syria, while Turkish military reinforcements have been deployed along the border.

On 30 July, Turkish television aired footage of heavily guarded military convoys moving from Kilis in Gaziantep towards the border with Syria. In addition to military vans, there were also armoured vehicles, tanks and mobile missile launchers.

Turkish officials have stated that the military buildup along the border is designed as a precaution against the possibly catastrophic fallout from Aleppo, where the Syrian army appears determined to recapture territory gained by the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has warned of an impending massacre in Syria's northern capital, where the regime has unleashed a combined air and land assault.

The attack was proof of the Syrian regime's brutality, Davutoglu said, appealing to the international community to take a firm and united stand against what he called a drive to punish people collectively for their revolt against the al-Assad regime.

Because of Aleppo's proximity to the Turkish border, the Turkish military has wanted to take such precautions, though it may also have wanted to step up its presence since flags of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) have appeared on walls and lampposts in Qamishli and other Syrian towns and villages along the Turkish border, as well as pictures of PKK leader Abdallah ?ñcalan.

These have been accompanied by banners calling for ?ñcalan's release from prison in Imraly, an island in the Sea of Marmara, where he has been serving a life sentence since February 1999. There are also pictures of the Kurdish separatists who have died in battles against Turkish forces in southeastern Anatolia.

According to the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet on 27 July, the PKK has been taking advantage of the warfare between the forces of the Al-Assad regime and the Free Syrian Army in order to accomplish its aim of establishing an independent Kurdish entity.

The alarm in Ankara has been heightened by the fact that the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party, linked to the PKK, now controls the border area.

Given the predominantly Kurdish population just across the border, it is not difficult to imagine the panic that has struck Turkish hyper-nationalists and their unflagging veneration for "one nation, one language, one flag and one indivisible land" in Turkey.

Erdogan himself has been clear that Turkey will not allow Kurdish separatist elements to control the border areas. "We cannot turn a blind eye to the cooperative relations between the separatist PKK and their separatist peers in Syria," he has said, going on to warn that any partition of Syrian territory could aggravate the sectarian conflict in Syria, in turn having dangerous repercussions for Turkey.

Erdogan has been adamantly opposed to any political or ethnic restructuring of northern Syria and has stressed that Turkey has the right to intervene there in the interests of "safeguarding the integrity of Turkish territory from terrorism."

Another indication of how disturbed Turkish officials have been by the situation in Qamishli is the visit Davutoglu plans to make to northern Iraq in the next few days, the purpose being to convey Ankara's disapproval of recent statements made by Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, to the effect that Syrian Kurds have been trained in Iraqi Kurdistan and sent back into Syria.

In spite of the Iraqi Kurdish region's strong relations with the ruling Justice and Development Party in Ankara, apparently it has needed to forge a separate course in view of the conflict between it and the Al-Maliki government in Baghdad.

Apparently, too, the Iraqi Kurds do not feel that they have to keep their Turkish ally informed on everything they do with regard to the fulfilment of the eternal dream of a purely Kurdish nation that would gather up the Kurdish diaspora.

Ankara is very uncomfortable with that dream, and it does not like being kept out of the loop. As a result, it has translated its discomfort into a display of military muscle, with a squadron of Turkish F-16 fighters soaring towards the Iraq border and then returning to make way for giant Cobra helicopters, which took off from the 36th border command regiment base on the outskirts of Emdinli.

Later, there were reports of aerial bombardments coming from areas near the Iraqi border.

To add to its discomfort, the Erdogan government is not getting the support it would like on the home front, with Kemal Kylyç Daraoglu, leader of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), reiterating his party's belief that Turkey is sliding down a slippery slope the West has created in order to mire Turkey in Syria.

Daraoglu has said that the Turkish people have no desire to enter into war with anyone and has cautioned against the consequences of any outbreak of sectarian strife in Syria.

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Cabinet announced

The new cabinet is expected to be sworn in today, Amani Maged reports

Prime Minister Hisham Qandil has finally selected a cabinet, ending a flurry of speculation in the media.

Qandil, appointed prime minister by Egypt's first Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Mursi, met with nearly 60 potential ministers in the last 10 days. Some turned down offers of jobs, others were vetoed by the president. The tortuous process of forming a government has now drawn to a close. New cabinet members will take the oath before President Mursi today.

Speculation focussed mainly on the political background of possible ministers. The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) had insisted on 15 portfolios, though commentators questioned whether or not it really mattered that ministers belonged to the party since the entire government would be operating under close Muslim Brotherhood control.

By press time yesterday two members of the FJP had been confirmed as ministers. Engineering professor Mustafa Mosaad has been named as education minister. Tarek Wafiq, the engineer who heads the FJP's housing committee, becomes minister of housing.

Head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) Hussein Tantawi keeps his post of minister of defence in the new cabinet, retaining the job to which he was first appointed in 1991. Article 52 of the constitutional addendum issued by the SCAF on 17 June stipulated that the head of the military council should remain minister of defence until a new constitution is in place.

Nadia Zakhari, minister of scientific research in the outgoing cabinet, keeps her post, as do Minister of Insurance and Social Affairs Nagwa Khalil and Minister of Antiquities Mohamed Ibrahim. They are joined by Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr and Finance Minister Momtaz El-Said, both of whom emerged from meetings with Qandil yesterday saying they would remain in post.

General Ahmed Gamaleddin, director of the Public Security Authority and a deputy minister of interior, has been promoted to interior minister. The Ministry of Tourism is to be headed by Hisham Zazou.

President of Al-Azhar University Osama El-Abd will head the Ministry of Religious Endowments -- Awqaf. This contradicts last week's public announcement by Salafi preacher Mohamed Yosri Ibrahim that he had been offered, and accepted, the post.

Former football player Alaa Sadek will head the newly-formed Ministry of Sports.

Osama Saleh, the head of the General Authority for Investment, has said he has been appointed investment minister and Osama Kamal, head of the Egyptian Petrochemical Holding Co and a leading member of the Engineers' Syndicate, is reported to be the new petroleum minister.

The Ministry of Communication will be headed by engineer Hani Mahmoud, former chief of the Cabinet Information Centre.

Some analysts have questioned the ability of many new ministers to successfully face the challenges their new posts bring. Their only qualification, say critics, is that they will accept dictates from the Muslim Brotherhood. Others argue that this is not necessarily a bad thing since should the new cabinet prove ineffectual voters will know who to blame come the next election.

Both the president and prime minister are aware that the government's performance will be carefully monitored, not just in Egypt but abroad.

So how much of a free hand did Mursi and Qandil enjoy in selecting the cabinet?

Many believe that the process was masterminded by the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a commonplace assumption that real power lies not with Mursi or Qandil, but with the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie.

Brotherhood sources publicly deny that Badie is running the country. In private, however, they admit that the FJP receives "a lot of help" from the Brotherhood. The party, says one source, is like a baby. It needs nursing and is not yet ready to be weaned.

It is impossible, for the time being, to draw any clear line between the presidency, the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood. Should the new government fail all three will be blamed.

Some commentators ask whether it is wise to appoint a cabinet with so many engineers. In addition to the confirmed appointments Mohamed Beshr, a member of the Arab Engineers Union and professor of electrical engineering at Menoufiya University, is widely tipped as the new minister of electricity, and Wael Rushdi, a water resource specialist, is a front runner for irrigation minister.

Atef Radwan, president of the Zagazig Faculty of Medicine, has been mentioned as future health minister and economist Tareq Radwan is expected to be offered one of the economic portfolios.

Some members of the outgoing cabinet, including Tourism Minister Mounir Fakhri Abdel-Nour, are reported to have refused offers to keep their jobs.

Qandil's government will be sworn in today, with President Mursi expected to chair the first cabinet meeting. In his letter of assignment to the new government, Mursi is likely to spell out measures for implementing his 100-day programme as well as ground rules for long-term action.

Expectations are high. Qandil and his new team may lack experience but they all share the knowledge that far more than their personal reputations hang in the balance.

In addition to reviewing Qandil's ministerial nominees, Mursi has been reviewing appointees to his own presidential team. The president's spokesman Yasser Ali told Al-Ahram Weekly that a complete list of the team will be published within days, and confirmed, till now, that media figure Hamdi Qandil, Islamic scholar Selim El-Awwa, activist Wael Khalil and Coptic intellectual Samir Morqos had been approached.

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Islamists and Arab constitutions

While many had hoped that the drafting of new constitutions in post-Arab Spring countries would reinforce a new consensus, Islamists are sowing more discord than harmony, writes Khalil El-Anani Members of the National Front for the Completion of the Revolution during a press conference

Having reached power in a number of Arab countries, Islamists have become an authentic party in the process of drafting constitutions in the countries of the Arab Spring. This reality raises numerous questions, not only on the components, substance and wording of the new constitutions, but also on how the process of drafting the constitution should be managed. The problem is particularly acute in Egypt, where a fierce battle rages between all parties, participants and non-participants alike.

The process of drafting a constitution is a reflection of deep and sometimes intense political, social and moral conflicts between diverse social and political forces in society, each of which seeks to leave its indelible mark on -- and safeguard its interests through -- the new charter. The broader the political and ideological gaps between the participant parties, the more arduous and stressful the task becomes. Clearly, therefore, it would be mistaken to imagine that constitutions are a set of aloof and detached texts when, in fact, these provisions represent a culmination of the conflicts between all sociopolitical forces in any given society.

Contrary to what some might imagine, the conflict over drafting a constitution is inherently fiercer and more complex in democratic countries or in countries in the aftermath of popular revolutions such as those that have swept the Arab world. It is a far cry from what happens in authoritarian countries where the constitutions tailored to the demands of the ruler can be stitched together relatively quickly and painlessly with no effective input from the people.

The difficult birth of the Constituent Assembly in Egypt, blame for which has been attributed to the Muslim Brothers' and Salafis' bid to dominate the drafting of the constitution, is only one aspect of the larger and gruelling battle that is unfolding in Egypt over the form and substance of the new constitution. Moreover, one is struck by the fact that the conflict is not restricted to Islamists versus liberals and secularists, alone. Another front has opened within the Islamist camp itself, between the Muslim Brothers and the Salafis, and this battle is part of the confrontation that has been raging between these two forces since the outset of the revolution and that has assumed numerous forms and extended into diverse realms of society, the media, and elsewhere in the public and private spheres.

In general, one observes four chief issues that have become the bones of contention between Islamists and other political forces with regard to the new Egyptian constitution. The first is the identity of the state, a question that to the Salafis, in particular, is a matter of life or death. Like other Islamists before them, the Salafis entered the political fray under the rubric of "protecting the identity of the nation". Many Salafi leaders and sheikhs justify their heavy involvement in politics today on the grounds of the need to defend the country from the peril of secularists and liberals. For our purposes here, there is no need to deconstruct and discuss this notion at length, although it should be stressed that it represents the Salafis' central obsession.

To a large extent, the battle over the country's identity is fabricated, for the concern has no basis in reality. The identity of the Egyptian state is not imperilled in any way. It has existed unchanged for centuries and no faction, regardless of its size and political weight, can tamper with it or alter it to suit its particular ideological outlook or partisan affiliation without putting that faction's popularity and political future at risk. In addition, many liberals and secularists not only affirm the Arab and Islamic identity of the state, but are also very proud of this identity in its broader cultural and civilisational sense as opposed to any narrow sectarian or ideological interpretation of it. True, there may be a handful of liberals who go to the extreme of disavowing their cultural identity or to the other extreme of a narrow and chauvinistic concept of Egypt's identity. However, the vast majority of liberals belong to movements, groups or trends that cherish their national cultural and religious identity and are keen to keep it free of all forms of subordination or degradation.

In fact, it is ironic, given today's battle lines, that Egypt's first constitution established the Arab and Islamic identity of the Egyptian state and this was promulgated in 1923, many years before the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood and the rise of the contemporary Islamist movement. The subsequent constitutions of 1954 and 1956 reaffirmed this identity, again in the absence of Islamist movements or parties.

It is important, here, to distinguish between the Salafis' and the Muslim Brotherhood's position on the identity question. To the Salafis, national identity is a matter that needs to be set down in the constitution in a manner that can brook no ambiguity whatsoever. The effect of such an inclination is to turn the constitution from a charter of general guiding principles to something akin to an instruction manual with provisions and wordings that lend themselves to extreme centralisation, rigidity and lack of imagination.

For example, Article 2 of the old constitution states that the principles of Islamic law are the primary source of legislation. The Salafis are determined to either to replace "principles" with the word "provisions" or simply to omit the word "principles" altogether. Salafi leaders argue that the reason this is necessary is to obviate a loose interpretation of "principles" that liberals or secularists would use to serve their purposes. The Muslim Brotherhood, for its part, has no problem with keeping the original wording of Article 2. They hold that the wording as it stands is sufficient to establish the role of Islamic law in legislation while guaranteeing the right of Christians and Jews to defer to their own religious laws on personal status matters.

The second bone of contention concerns the general spirit of the constitution. Some Islamists, especially the Salafis, are being unmistakably expedient, if not opportunistic, in their approach to drafting the constitution now that they have been presented with this historic and unlikely to be repeated opportunity. Apart from their obsession with subsidiary and sometimes purely formal questions, the terms and language they use for the wording of the articles they seek to modify or introduce indicate that they are determined to draft an "Islamic" constitution, not in the general civilisational sense of the term, but rather as defined by their particular ideological and political outlook and agenda.

The danger of this resides not only in the Islamists' political vision, with which many disagree, but also when it comes to move from the general to the specific. If already the Islamists have exhibited a high degree of inflexibility on some major general issues that had been previously presumed to have a consensus, what will be the case during the discussion of the personal and civil freedoms and liberties for which the 25 January Revolution was waged? On the whole, the Muslim Brotherhood has been less uncompromising than the Salafis on this score. Yet, their recent silence on some crucial issues -- whether due to their preoccupation with affairs of government since Mohamed Mursi became president or to a desire to avoid a contest of ideological one-upmanship with the Salafis in which the Salafis would attempt to cast aspersions on the Muslim Brotherhood's "Muslim" credentials -- has encouraged the Salafis to press for constitutional changes that conform with their particular ideological outlook. For example, the Salafis insist that Al-Azhar should be the sole source of authority in the interpretation of Article 2, especially in the event that the term "principles" is retained. The notion stirred an outcry among intellectuals and political and rights activists, and it was also opposed by Al-Azhar itself. However, the Muslim Brotherhood made no comment, in spite of the major precedent such a provision would set in the history of Egyptian constitutions and in spite of the dangerous repercussions it could have on Egyptian political life and society.

The third major bone of contention concerns the form of government and the powers of the president. The Islamists are clearly inclined to a mixed presidential-parliamentary, or semi-presidential system that confers powers on both the parliament and the president at the same time. This conflicts with the view of many political activists who prefer a fully parliamentary system so as to ensure that the will of the people remains the true source of sovereignty and power. Again, the Salafis and Muslim Brothers are at odds on this issue. The former want an equal distribution of powers between the president and parliament, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood, as the organisation's lawyer, Sobhi Saleh, stated in a recent press interview, favours granting broader powers to the president, especially with regard to the appointment of ministers, the right to dissolve the People's Assembly and the Shura Council, declaration of war and, of course, the right to amend the constitution.

Political and individual rights and freedoms, which will be up for discussion soon, form the fourth area of contention. Most likely, the Salafis will seek to restrict the scope of rights and freedoms, or at least "Islamise" them through a redefinition of their scope, concept and substance in accordance with their particular understanding and interpretation of Islam. The question will certainly be problematic and attempts to shackle the realm of civil and individual liberties will naturally arouse the anger of a large segment of intellectuals and political activists who believe that such freedoms are the real guarantee against the reproduction of the despotism and authoritarianism that Egypt has experienced during the past three decades. The views on this issue held by this body of opinion and those of the Islamists, and the Salafis in particular, could not be further apart.

Many had hoped that the process of drafting a new constitution would serve as a means to restructure and cement political and social relations within the framework of a new and balanced social contract. Unfortunately, it appears that the blinkered vision of some Islamists is turning the process into a minefield of discord that will entrench the ideological and political polarisation of Egyptian society.

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The Arabs in transition

Finally the Arabs are responding to global winds of change. Not all, but all will in time, writes Ayman El-Amir

As the Syrian revolution reaches its pinnacle, with the ouster or termination of President Bashar Al-Assad in sight, other Arab rulers should begin to ponder the future of their regimes. It may seem that, cushioned with oil and gas wealth, these regimes, particularly in the Gulf Arab region, are more secure in their seats of power than politically troubled states like Sudan. However, revolutionary change has its own logic and rationale that are only belatedly perused, dissected and analysed by historians. It took Eastern Europe nearly half-a-century to break free from oppressive Soviet domination and overthrow their ruling Soviet agents; it took nearly one million Egyptians 18 days to topple former president Hosni Mubarak. Perhaps, the most predictable rationale is not just extreme poverty, political marginalisation, ideological indoctrination or iron-fist rule, but resistance to change. And resistance to change betrays lack of vision beyond continuing the status quo.

Obviously, there is a different course of historical development between Middle Eastern countries and Gulf Arab States. The first passed from Ottoman rule to the colonial era to post-independence nationalist dictatorships that were recently scrapped by the four revolutions that unfolded since 2010, with Yemen still in a limbo. The republican regimes that emerged in the post-colonial era were presumably changeable at the ballot box. However, they usually lasted for decades by fraud until the ruling dictator either expired or was overthrown by a military coup or civil war.

The Gulf sheikhdoms emerged from the Trucial States' status under British protection to independence in 1971. Except for Kuwait, they skipped the transition to the modern state condition to emirates followed by statehood without the attributes of a modern state or democratic institutions. With abundant oil and gas wealth they were accepted as newly independent democratic states by the United Nations, albeit without democratic institutions. They became dynastic monarchies that are striving to reach a happy medium between absolute monarchy and modern statehood. On the other side, republican Arab regimes were inching cautiously towards a form of republican monarchy, as the case in Egypt, Syria and Libya revealed. If the modern republican system provided that a head of state or government could be changed at the ballot box, or by fraudulent elections as the case may be, the substitution of rulers in monarchical emirates is effected only by succession in case of the death of the established ruler, or sometimes by a palace coup. The people who, in modern definition, have come to be the source of power and owners of the country's wealth, are far removed from the selection process, which takes place in a small group of senior emirs behind closed doors. The introduction, early on, of the post of crown prince is designed to pre-empt ruling family competition at the time of succession.

In the sea change that has so far engulfed five Arab countries, with more to come, how would hereditary, non-pseudo-republican regimes hold back the tidal wave? One way, perhaps, is to throw money at it. King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz of Saudi Arabia generously donated more than $40 billion in gifts to the nation last year. It was designed to placate disgruntled young Saudis agitating for wide-ranging reforms. But the carrot goes with the stick, too. About the same time last year, Saudi Arabia sent tanks, armoured vehicles and soldiers into Bahrain to help its government quell a protest movement by the dominantly Shia population of the country who were demanding reform. It was effective in both suppressing the protest and in sending a Gulf-wide warning that tampering with the monarchical status quo is hazardous and should not even be considered. In effect, the policy of security alertness, and crackdown when necessary, is the first, and probably the last line of defence for these states. While poverty may not relatively present a problem to the nationals of the emirate-state or, to a lesser extent, to migrant workers, issues of discrimination, tutelage of foreign workers by a national in return for a commission, or sub-standard living conditions, in addition to the rights of minorities, present latent threats to the stability of these countries. And the answer is usually to invoke the first line of defence, that is, security force, including arbitrary arrest and detention. That, however, was and remains the state security mechanism on which the four defunct Arab regimes were pegged, including 15 intelligence agencies in Syria alone.

The paradigm of forced takeover of power away from the ballot box has changed, though. Clandestine military coups of the 1950s and 1960s have now been replaced by the power of mass protest, armed or unarmed. For the past 40 years, Arab autocrats learned that the armed forces were the key to forced change of the regime. Therefore, they isolated them, pampered them or appointed their close family members or trusted loyalists to positions of control. Now, the paradigm has significantly shifted in favour of the people. When the Egyptian military command, for example, intervened in the clashes between protesters and security forces on 28 January 2011, it did so not according to its pre-assigned role as Mubarak's last line of defence, but to protect protesters and the masses of the people, as well as state institutions. In Syria, Al-Assad's army commanders are defecting in droves to the side of the Syrian protesters.

Ruling party propagandists and government-controlled media failed to persuade the impoverished masses of the people that they were living "the most splendid era of democracy" they have ever seen, in the words of Safwat El-Sherif, one of the closest confidantes of former president Mubarak, who is now on trial. Now the power of the people on the street has taken over revolutionary change, as was the case in Tahrir Square in Cairo, and the Pearl Roundabout in Manama, Bahrain. For Gulf States with small populations, high-tech security mechanisms are more than adequate to control protests. Protesters still do not have the critical mass to mount a full-fledged revolution. During the mass protest at the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain, the joke went around Cairo that Bahrainis wanted to launch a million-man demonstration, but the total population was only 750,000. Could they borrow the rest from Egypt?

Revolutionary change in the Gulf Arab States does not have to be violent -- a people against ruler confrontation. The problem is that rulers believe their people are wallowing in petro-gas and oil wealth, and the benefits deriving from them, like no other people in the world. However, as the Bible says, man does not live on bread alone. Fundamental reforms giving the people a wider role in shaping their future and the way they are ruled are largely lacking. Activists are demanding fundamental freedoms and human rights.

The concept of constitutional monarchy was neither created overnight nor without suffering. The Queen of England, Elizabeth II, nominally owns Great Britain, but the people, with an elected parliament and representative government, manage national wealth and all institutions that have developed over many years. However, the Queen cannot lease Scotland, sell the River Thames or enter into business deals for her own benefit. She, as a monarch, does receive benefits approved by the House of Commons. Would this be a far-fetched idea for the Gulf Arab states? There are, of course, sovereign funds from plush oil and gas earnings that are kept for "future generations", but is it not a one-man rule that controls everything? There are associated huge business interests, of course. But to what extent can these be guaranteed in the future, even if they are deposited in foreign banks, funds or invested in foreign businesses? And at what cost in conflict and bloodshed?

The world is changing and the Arab region is, at long last, responding to these changes and to the principles that motivate the change. Nothing is sacrosanct anymore. Will the rest of the Arab region see the writing on the wall?

The writer is former corespondent of Al-Ahram in Washington, DC, and former director of the UN Radio and Television in New York.

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