Al-Maliki takes charge

By moving to take over the country's foreign policy, the Iraqi prime minister has cast his Kurdish foreign minister to one side, writes Salah Nasrawi Residents gather at the site of a bomb attack in Mwafaqiya village at Mosul. A suicide bomber driving a truck attacked a Shia mosque

Iraq's Shia Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki set up a government panel to oversee the country's foreign policy this week, moving more aggressively than ever to concentrate political power in his hands at a time when concerns are spreading that Iraq's foreign policy has been unsuccessful during a time of regional turmoil.

Al-Maliki also ordered a government review of Iraq's relationship with Turkey after a series of disputes with its powerful northern neighbour over a string of issues including the upheaval in Syria and Ankara's increasing involvement in Iraq's sectarian and ethnic conflicts.

The maneuvers could cement a major shift in power in the face of opposition from Iraq's Kurds to the Shia prime minister's push to consolidate his authority further in a country that has been led by a fragile coalition government since the 2003 US-led invasion.

There are fears that Al-Maliki's moves could trigger a backlash and further divide a nation in which many are wary of a possible spillover from Syria and regional ethnic and sectarian polarisation.

The new government committee, to be headed by Al-Maliki himself, will include several cabinet ministers, the chief of the Iraqi National Security Council and the head of the parliament's foreign relations committee.

A statement by Al-Maliki's office said the committee would be working as a watchdog to follow up the implementation of its decisions by the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic staff.

It said that one of the major tasks of the new committee would be to "unify the discourse of the state on foreign issues and prevent any discrepancies".

By moving to tighten his grip on the country's foreign policy, Al-Maliki also seems to be trying to curtail the power of Kurdish Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari. While Zebari will be a member of the new committee, he will lose absolute control over foreign policy-making.

Zebari, a veteran Kurdish politician and former guerrilla fighter, has been the country's chief diplomat for the last nine years, tasked with helping to shape a new vision for Iraq's foreign relations in the post-Saddam Hussein era.

Al-Maliki's move against him comes amid wide concerns about Iraq's foreign-policy orientation and whether it reflects national strategic interests at a critical juncture when Iraq is wracked with unrest and instability.

As the turmoil in Syria continues, concerns about Baghdad's foreign policy have been growing, with many Iraqis believing that the country lacks adequate and effective diplomacy to deal with the bubbling cauldron of political problems abroad.

In a recent incident, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry came under fire after Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu paid a surprise visit to the disputed city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq while on a trip to the Kurdish region for talks with its leader Masoud Barzani, also Zebari's nephew.

Davutoglu's visit drew furious reactions from Baghdad and brought the already-chilly relations between the two countries to a new low. Kirkuk is part of a chunk of disputed territory that, along with oil resources, is among the main points of contention between Baghdad and the Kurdistan regional government.

The visit, the first to the city by a Turkish foreign minister since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the first world war, is fraught with symbolism because of the Turkomen, a Turkish ethnic minority that still lives in the province.

Iraq's Foreign Ministry was chided for facilitating the visit by issuing a visa to Davutoglu, who did not travel through Baghdad. The ministry said it had not previously been informed about the Kirkuk visit and did not approve of the trip.

Iraq had previously accused Turkey of fueling tensions between Baghdad and the Kurds over control of territory and oilfields by dealing with the Iraqi Kurdistan region as if it were an independent state.

In July, the region began to export oil to Turkey without Baghdad's permission, a move which the Baghdad government termed "illegal". Turkey also started building export pipelines that would bypass routes controlled by Baghdad.

Last week, Al-Maliki formed a special committee to "investigate the circumstances of the Turkish foreign minister's visit to Kirkuk and present recommendations to the cabinet."

The Iraqi government said it was reconsidering its relationship with Ankara after the Turkish foreign minister's visit, and this would have been bad news for Zebari, who has seen his power steadily diminishing.

Zebari has long been accused of mismanagement and of lacking inter-agency coordination. Critics say he has turned the foreign ministry into a nest of incompetent, politically appointed diplomats and corrupt cronies.

He has been branded by members of the parliament's foreign relations committee as "uncooperative" and slammed for his refusal to bring his ministry under scrutiny. The committee has repeatedly complained that Zebari has brushed aside requests for briefings on the country's foreign policy.

On Tuesday, the head of the committee, Hummam Hamoudi, asked the Iraqi parliament to veto a list of new diplomats recruited by Zebari for being "unbalanced".

One of the criticisms of Zebari has been that he has failed to take advantage of Iraq's presidency of the rotating Arab summit to advance Iraqi diplomacy and foreign relations.

Nearly six months after the last annual summit, which cost Baghdad some $500 million to host, Zebari is being portrayed as unable to take the kind of initiatives that would put Iraq centre stage in Arab and regional politics or promote the country's national interests.

Thus far, Zebari has not voiced displeasure at Al-Maliki's moves to take control of the country's foreign policy, though he has insisted in interviews that the country's political leaders stand united on foreign affairs.

In the past Zebari has complained of what he has termed a "multiplicity" of decision-making centres in Baghdad and the negative impact this has had on Iraq's foreign relations and formulating a clear vision of foreign relations.

Scepticism about Zebari's performance could be owing to more than just his diplomatic style, since his failure to forge an effective Iraqi foreign policy could be rooted in the way the Kurds perceive their future in Iraq.

Many Iraqis believe that Zebari may be serving a long-term Kurdish agenda of breaking away from Iraq, aiming to make this goal attainable when the time comes. Some Iraqi officials note that Kurdistan has already been emerging as a "hostile foreign country" on Iraq's border.

Last month, Zebari told the French newspaper Le Monde that the Kurds "will be proud to have our own state, which I hope can be achieved shortly." He said the Kurds were "capable of separating from Iraq, but at this stage international pressure will not allow it."

As the war in Syria rages on, the political crisis in Iraq is deepening, and Al-Maliki's move to take control of the country's foreign policy could be a warm-up act for the storm that could start brewing in Baghdad soon.

On Sunday, Al-Maliki warned that "Iraq is in the eye of the storm, but we have succeeded in overcoming the storm before and we can succeed again." However, the evidence indicates that time may not be on his side.

Iraq's political rot is deepening, and fixing Iraq's diplomacy could become ever more elusive as time goes by.

View the original article here

This post was made using the Auto Blogging Software from WebMagnates.org This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.

Romney's fawning to Jewish voters

The recent comments made by US presidential-elections candidate Mitt Romney were evidence of the most appalling political opportunism, writes Mohamed El-Mokhtar

The wide contrast between Palestinian economic hardship, an Israeli-imposed ordeal for the most part, and the Western-bankrolled, American-subsidised Israeli prosperity lies squarely, according to Mitt Romney, in the "cultural superiority" of a people whose overall performance has been, after all, enhanced by the heavenly hand of "providence".

This type of bigotry has no equal, save for the insolence, cynicism and utter ignorance of its author. Such racist inanities are frankly sickening, even when uttered by an empty-headed plebeian, let alone a presumed political leader who is also, after all, the product of an elite schooling. It is not only the absurdity of the statement that is appalling. The sycophantic delirium of the speaker in question exceeds in many respects the apex of human hypocrisy.

Had the Palestinians been living in a free and viable state of their own, and not been coercively placed under a state of quasi-siege for over 40 years, stripped of their freedom of movement, geographically squeezed, and economically suffocated by a relentless military occupation, maybe Romney's mendacity would have made, albeit awkwardly, some kind of sense.

Had the statement in question not been made during a fund-raising event, this sort of pro-Zionist pandering could perhaps have been at least taken at face value -- that is, as the reckless but sincere words of a dummy apologist.

However, the setting in this case was carefully chosen, and the delivery was purposely staged. Nothing in this dramatic dithyramb was actually missing, or even coincidental. Everything was there to befit the solemnity of the moment: the location of the event, the choice of the background, the words used, the facial expressions, the smirking. Everything was carefully calibrated for the same purpose.

Admittedly, for someone who came in expressly to grovel in front of potential benefactors there were few other things that could have been done, given the way that everything seemed masterfully tailored for this ultimate plea. The whole drama reeks of the most basic political opportunism. It was, at best, the venal performance of a character desperately trying to flatter his wealthy audience in order to garner votes and financial support. In so doing, he would have wanted the echoes of his ingratiating comments to be heard in the ballot boxes on election day.

If Romney's listeners at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem that day had still been trapped in the squalor of the Warsaw ghetto, or inside the Stalinist gulag of Birobidzhan, without purses or voting power, would Romney's attitude towards them have been the same? Would his heart still have been bursting with the same sentiments of awe and admiration? Or would he, more likely, like many others before him, be indifferent to their fate, with nothing to offer but cold indifference, if not condescension and contempt?

Does Romney know that in Nazi Germany, there were also some who attributed the dreadful experience of the crematoriums and gas chambers to the invisible "hand of providence"? Indeed, myriad cynics, not all of whom were Nazis, had the chutzpah back then to somehow blame the innocent victims for the gruesome fate they unjustly endured, since it was not uncommon at that time to blame the Jews' suffering on the supposed "abnormality" of their race, their "backward" creed, or the "awkward" nature of their culture.

Could Romney ever imagine, for instance, the state of Utah under a scenario as follows: a brutal military occupation that slices up the territory into separate small entities littered with permanent military check points, expels many of its most capable people, cuts off the State from the outside world, robs it of its underground water supplies, imposes regular closures on one half of the population and a total blockade on the other half, and metes out sporadic incursions on one, while showering the other with seasonal aerial bombing?

Would Utah be capable under these dire circumstances of developing and earning Romney's praise and love?

Romney's perceptions notwithstanding, the Palestinians are far from being a sluggish people. Despite countless impediments, they have retained a vibrant society. Always entrepreneurial and industrious, they have never languished in lethargy or sunk into despair. Literacy rates stand at 98 per cent -- an overachievement, by any standards, for a people still struggling against the odds to free itself from long subjugation.

Another proof, if there is need of one, of the Palestinians' extraordinary aptitude and self-reliance is the notable success of their Diaspora, which is hailed for its contributions in every corner of the globe.

Romney has not met too many Palestinians, yet the only Palestinian he encountered during his unwelcome visit, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, could have taught him at least one basic skill he sorely lacks, one that is a critical quality for anyone aspiring to a position of leadership: good diplomatic etiquette.

However, neither this type of prejudice about Arabs, nor the pathetic pandering to pro-Israeli groups is specific to Romney, or a novelty within the American political establishment. Romney may have taken the reenactment of the play to new heights, but he hardly invented the drama himself. This self-imposed public strip-tease has been played over and over again to varying degrees by representatives of the entire American political spectrum with very few exceptions.

During every political campaign, some apparently feel as though religiously compelled to go to extremes in indulging the whims of a political lobby that caters to the needs of a foreign country. Because the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) imposes as a rite of passage a demand for absolute loyalty to Israel, election candidates have to compete in outmatching each other to win its much-coveted favour before any election ?ê" hence this frenzy of faithful vows and pledges of allegiance.

Many play this game simply out of fear of political retribution, for there is no denying that pro-Zionist interest groups have effectively intimidated the American political establishment by systematically attacking anyone who dares challenge the status quo. The establishment has either sold out or chickened out. This is true not only of the WASP establishment, which has long been known for its lack of courage, but even of the more forthright African-American leadership, which has now bowed to the pressure.

As in the case of the gun lobby, or those interest groups working for the business elite, this type of subordination to the diktats of the few is indicative of the moral bankruptcy and systemic corruption affecting the entire political system in the US, the expression of which is to be found in the current undemocratic balance of power.

On the one hand, there are the ruling political elites and business oligarchies at the summit of the social pyramid, and on the other hand the disempowered masses, kept at bay by the soporific propaganda of a profit-driven media.

The writer is a political analyst.

View the original article here

This post was made using the Auto Blogging Software from WebMagnates.org This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.

Special: Tales of Abdine

The Abdine area of Cairo, developed in the 19th century by the Khedive Ismail, is full of memories of the city's past, writes Samir Sobhi Clockwise from top left: Abdine Palace, in 1870 and 1945; a baladi café, 1890; Tahrir Square, 1970; Abdine Square, 1892; liquorice vendor, 1920; sweet potato seller, 1920

According to Abdel-Moneim Shemeis, former head of the State Information Service, the Cairo neighbourhood of Abdine came into being after the Khedive Ismail built the Abdine Palace and planned the streets around it. Wide, modern streets were created all the way from the Bab Al-Hadid (Gate of Iron) to the north, Sheikh Rihan to the west, the Citadel to the east, and Sayeda Zeinab to the south.

The Khedive Ismail bought Abdine Palace from a man called Abdine Bey, a former army commander. Near the palace, he constructed a building to house the Royal Guard, currently the offices of the governorate of Cairo.

To the east of Abdine, Kantaret Sonqor (the Sonqor Bridge) once connected the neighbourhood of Abdine with Al-Helmiya Al-Gadida and Darb Al-Gamamiz (Sycamore Road), which ran along the eastern side of the Khalij Al-Misri, the transportation canal that passed behind the palace and whose course matches the current Port Said Street.

The Sonqor Bridge was vital because many flour mills were located nearby, people at that time buying flour in bulk in order to make bread in their yards. There were bakeries as well, of course, but most bread was produced in private homes, and baking was part of the daily routine of cooking.

On Midan Lazoghli in the Mounira neighbourhood, there is an interesting mansion -- now under renovation -- which once doubled as the Finance Ministry and residence of Ismail El-Mofattesh, treasurer of the Khedive Ismail. Foreign diplomats entertained in the mansion wrote with admiration about the mud ovens in the courtyard, one of them being made from ancient tiles believed to date back to Pharaonic times.

Not far from Abdine Palace in the direction of Sayeda Zeinab is the Haret Al-Zir Al-Moallaq (Alley of the Suspended Drinking Pot), a street named after a drinking pot hung from chains rather than being placed in a four-legged ring stand as was the usual practice. The writer Ahmed Roshdi Saleh also lived in this street when he was studying literature at Cairo University.

Traditional drinking vessels were often placed in areas that did not have a sabil, or water fountain. One of the most remarkable sabils in Abdine is that of Mansour Pasha Yakan on the corner of Nubar Street a few steps away from the Interior Ministry.

Nearby is the Haret Al-Saqayyin (Alley of the Water Carriers), once one of the most sought-after streets in the neighbourhood. Among the celebrities who lived there in the past was Mohamed Pasha Al-Hakim, owner of the first printing house for medical books in the country.

The 19th-century British chronicler Edward William Lane also lived here, author of The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (1836). Lane used to dress in Ottoman clothing and was known in the neighbourhood as "Mansour Effendi". Prime minister Boutros Pasha Ghali and Al-Ahram editor Dawoud Barakat were also born there.

Farther to the west where the Omar Makram Mosque now stands a small mosque, or zawya, once stood. This was called the Zawyet Al-Sheikh Al-Abit (Mosque of the Dim-Witted Sheikh), and the nearby street was named after it. Across the street, there is an Italianate building that was formerly Egypt's Foreign Ministry. Originally, the building belonged to Fakhri Pasha, son-in-law to King Fouad.

Shemeis is interested in the history of Al-Sheikh Al-Abit, saying that "I got interested in the sheikh and learned that he used to work for the intelligence service of Mohamed Ali, part of the secret police apparatus run by Sheikh Youssef, the intelligence chief at the time. Youssef hired dozens of men and women to collect intelligence about life in the country, and he would compile their accounts in a periodic report sent to Mohamed Ali."

Sheikh Youssef used to live in a house behind the Al-Saniya School in Sayeda Zeinab, and the door of the house had a secret opening for informants to drop their reports into. Sheikh Youssef is now buried in a mausoleum on the first floor of a grand residential building on Qasr Al-Aini Street not far from the parliament.

While the intelligence service collected news for the palace, journalism was beginning to emerge as a source of information for the general public. Journalists had to gather news about the government and its activities, and since most government buildings were concentrated in Mounira, journalists used to congregate in a coffeehouse not far from Lazoghli Square. This was called the Qahwet Abu Shanab because the Greek owner had an impressive moustache, or shanab.

In the middle of Lazoghli Square, there is a statue of Lazoghli Pasha, who served first as treasurer and then as prime minister under Mohamed Ali. Lazoghli died before photography was invented, and when Ismail Pasha decided to honour him with a statue, the French sculptor commissioned for the job asked for a picture of the subject.

This posed a problem for the Khedive Ismail's aides, who couldn't locate one. Then one day the governor of Cairo encountered a water carrier near Khan Al-Khalili who looked exactly like Lazoghli. He took the man home, dressed him as an Ottoman aristocrat, called the photographer, and soon the sculptor had just what he needed to complete his statue.

View the original article here

This post was made using the Auto Blogging Software from WebMagnates.org This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.

Power deficits to continue

With power cuts still leaving Egyptians sweltering in a hot summer, Sherine Abdel-Razek looks at the medium term prospects for new power generation

Soon after the Eid vacation, which marks the end of Ramadan, 9pm will be the closing time for shops around Egypt, a move aimed at reducing demand on electricity. While reactions to the decision are mixed, it is too early to know if this move alone will resolve Egypt's recurrent power crises.

Demand on electricity in Egypt has increased with economic growth. According to the Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC), a think tank affiliated to the council of ministers, the amount of electricity locally generated increased by 78 per cent in 2009/2010 compared to its level in 2000/2001, to reach 129 gigawatts per hour. Meanwhile, the amount of electricity consumed soared 95 per cent during the same period to reach 127 gigawatts per hour.

Power cuts have been a seasonal problem since 2008. According to a report prepared by the African Development Bank on the power sector, nominal generation capacity is less than summer peak demand. Peak electricity demand increased by more than 200 per cent between 1990 and 2009. As a result, dispatchers resorted to load shedding in the summers of 2008, 2009 and 2010. However, the problem exacerbated during the current and past year.

The African Development Bank report notes that although the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC) added some capacity since 2008, the reserve margin (between production capacity and consumption) will remain low for the next several years, generally below 10 per cent instead of a standard 12-15 per cent needed to ensure adequate levels of reliability.

There are plans to moderate demand growth, which is forecast to continue at a rather high annual rate of 6.5 per cent over the 2010-2020 period, as highlighted by the AFDB report. An IDSC report entitled, The Status and Future of the Power Industry in Egypt, noted that, "there are four five-year-plans to add an extra 58 gigawatts to national production by year 2027."

According to these plans, the contribution of renewable energy to overall energy production will increase to reach 20 per cent. No matter what energy mix the country decides to pursue, investment requirements are large. "In practice, power supply capacity should expand by about 2,000 megawatts per year, which in turn implies an investment of approximately $3 billion to $4 billion per year," noted the African Development Bank report.

Recognising limited cash flow in the power sector, the government has adopted a plan to remove constraints. This includes gradual removal of subsidies on energy intensive industries. Moreover, it has decided to use public private partnership projects as well as private sector schemes to mobilise resources, according to the African Development Bank.

Worth mentioning is that the power industry is almost totally controlled by the public sector, with the EEHC representing the majority of the sector's assets. However, private equity totalling about $350 million entered the sector through three private power projects in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Last year the number of Egyptians connected to the national grid was 26.6 million. Egyptian per capita consumption reached 1,782 kilowatts per hour in 2009/2010 compared to a global average of 2,730 kilowatts per hour. Egypt is the lowest in per capita consumption among its regional peers.

The residential sector accounts for almost half of total electricity consumption, a very high percentage when compared to the international average, and the industrial sector for a fifth.

Residential units represent the bulk of the electricity subsidy bill. Egypt adopts a bracket pricing system for billing electricity consumption at home, starting with LE0.05 for the first 50 kilowatts per hour and increasing to LE0.48 for the consumption of more than 1,000 kilowatts per hour.

The price of different brackets saw gradual increases since 1992 that range between 32.5 per cent for the lowest bracket and 92 per cent for the highest.

As well as direct subsidy, Egyptians benefit in electricity prices from subsidies given to fuel used in power generation.

View the original article here

This post was made using the Auto Blogging Software from WebMagnates.org This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.

Consecrating the pharaoh

President Mohamed Mursi now enjoys the powers of an absolute dictator. What will he do with them, asks Gamal Essam El-Din

Egypt's civilian president, Mohamed Mursi, moved on more than one front this week to consolidate his powers.

On 12 August Mursi ordered the retirement of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, 76, the Mubarak-era minister of defence and, post Mubarak's ouster, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), along with the army's chief of staff Sami Anan and several other generals.

Tantawi and Anan are being retained as presidential advisers. On Tuesday Tantawi was awarded the Nile Medal, Anan the Medal of the Republic.

The new minister of defence is Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, 58, the hitherto low-profile chief of military intelligence. El-Sisi also takes over as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

Major General Sedqi Sobhi, 59, becomes the new chief of military of staff, promoted from his post as head of the Third Field Army responsible for the Suez Canal and Sinai. SCAF member Mohamed El-Assar becomes assistant minister of defence. El-Assar is the army's main conduit for US-Egyptian military cooperation.

Mursi also removed Mohamed Mimish as commander-in-chief of the navy, appointing him chairman of Suez Canal Authority. Abdel-Aziz Seif appointed as chairman of the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation.

Mursi also selected the reformist judge Mahmoud Mekki as his vice president. Mekki is thought to have been recommended for the post by his brother Ahmed, the newly-appointed minister of justice.

Mahmoud Mekki was a leading member of the group of reformist judges that publicised the flagrant rigging of the 2005 parliamentary elections.

Mahmoud Mekki's responsibilities have yet to be made public. Most commentators believe that he will be charged with restructuring the judiciary and seeking common ground among rival forces over Egypt's future political agenda.

Secular forces and the independent Judges' Club received the news of the Mekki brothers' appointments cautiously, with the Judges' Club warning it would resist any interference in judicial affairs.

Mursi's reshuffle came just 10 days after Prime Minister Hisham Qandil unveiled his cabinet. Announced on 2 August, Qandil had retained Tantawi as minister of defence.

Analysts had assumed Tantawi was retained, along with his deputy at SCAF Anan, as a secular counterweight to Islamist President Mursi and the political ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood, the group from which Mursi hails.

Yet between 2 and 12 August Mursi clearly had second thoughts about Tantawi and Anan retaining their positions. Why?

There are two reasons. First came the 5 August terrorist attack in North Sinai which left 16 Egyptian border guards dead. It was followed by protests which prevented Mursi from attending the funeral of the victims, and which saw Prime Minister Hisham Qandil attacked by angry crowds when he turned up for the funeral prayers.

Mursi subsequently accused the chief of military police of failing to safeguard the funeral against furious protesters and asked Tantawi to fire him.

By 8 August chief of general intelligence Mourad Mowafi, the head of the Cairo Security Directorate, the head of Egypt's Republican Guards and the governor of North Sinai had all lost their jobs over the debacle.

Professor of political science at the Suez Canal University Gamal Zahran believes the 6 August funeral protests had embarrassed Mursi too much for him not to take action.

"They made him look like a figurehead president. He was forced to move quickly to restore his standing in the eyes of the public," says Zahran.

The funeral protests were the straw that broke the camel's back and Mursi acted quickly to cement his powers.

"Mursi may also have suspected that leading military officials had a hand in orchestrating the protests and, acting on those suspicions, orchestrated the coup against them."

The swiftness of Mursi's reaction of to the events on 5 and 6 August, says Zahran, suggests the president was also keen to pre-empt the demonstration against the Muslim Brotherhood called for 24 and 25 August.

Mursi's surprise move, Zahran points out, appeared to have been coordinated with the Brotherhood, which immediately mobilised thousands of its rank and file in Tahrir Square and around the presidential palace.

In the Islamist-dominated Shura Council Brotherhood deputies demanded Minister of Investment Osama Saleh close down the Faraeen (Pharaohs) satellite channel and filed a lawsuit against the independent daily Al-Dostour.

Faraeen and Al-Dostour had campaigned relentlessly against Mursi and the Brotherhood.

Tawfik Okasha, the owner of the Faraeen, and Islam Afif, the editor of Al-Dostour, were referred to criminal trial on 13 August on charges of slandering Mursi and inciting violence against him. The charges have irked the Press Syndicate which views them as the harbinger of an Islamist crackdown on the press.

Okasha's Faraeen had been instrumental in drumming up support for the anti-Brotherhood demonstrations planned for later this month. The aim of the protests, first propagated by former MP Mohamed Abu Hamed, was to draw attention to the Brotherhood's finances, which are shrouded in mystery, and test the legitimacy of the group.

Brotherhood officials agree that "Mursi's fears of a counter-revolution against his rule encouraged him to make bold decisions and assume full powers."

"The military establishment's weak response to the Sinai massacre and its lack of discipline, especially compared to the Israelis, was a major reason behind Mursi's 12 August orders," says leading Brotherhood official Essam El-Erian. The military, he added, should no longer be distracted by politics but must devote itself fully to safeguarding the national security.

"Mursi's orders also sent a clear message to counter-revolutionary forces that they reconsider their planed actions against the democratically elected president," argues El-Erian. "They have made it clear that thousands stand behind the president. They will refuse to allow anyone to shake his standing."

In a speech on the evening of 12 August a confident looking Mursi said his decisions "were not aimed to antagonise anyone" and urged his supporters to stand behind him "to recover stability".

Tantawi and Anan were the last of the Mubarak old guard to retain their hold on power. Omar Suleiman, Mubarak's chief of general intelligence and vice president, died last month. Ahmed Shafik, Mubarak's last prime minister and Mursi's rival in presidential elections, has left Egypt for the United Arab Emirates and is not expected back any time soon.

Mursi's personnel changes were only the tip of the iceberg. He also cancelled the constitutional addendum issued by the military on 17 June that limited the authority of the president. Mursi replaced SCAF's declaration with one of his own, giving himself broad legislative and executive powers, including the right to appoint a new constituent assembly should the current assembly fail to draft a new constitution on time.

Mursi's cancellation of the 17 June declaration left many secular forces in a state of shock.

"The Islamist takeover of Egypt is now under way," railed Tagammu Party Chairman Rifaat El-Said. "By abrogating the 17 June supplementary declaration Mursi has established the foundations for an Islamist dictatorship."

"Secular forces have always insisted the army should return to its barracks only once a new constitution is in place and new parliamentary elections have been held. Now the army is no longer part of the equation we are about to see the emergence of an Islamist pharaoh with the kind of absolute powers not even Mubarak accrued."

Constitutional experts question the legitimacy of Mursi's abrogation of the 17 June constitutional addendum.

"When he took the constitutional oath on 30 June Mursi swore that he would respect the 17 June supplementary declaration," says constitutional law expert Shawqi El-Sayed. "Mursi's cancellation of the June constitutional addendum clearly contradicts his presidential oath.

"It provides yet more evidence that Mursi is in thrall to the Muslim Brotherhood whose leaders organised public rallies against the June supplementary declaration."

Brotherhood officials insist that the current concentration of power in Mursi's hands is temporary.

"His legislative decisions will be reviewed once a new parliament is elected," says senior Freedom and Justice Party official Saad El-Husseini. "Mursi will be keen to consult with political forces before exercising any of his legislative powers."

They are the kind of promises that a majority of secularists and liberals are tired of hearing.

So is Mursi emerging as Egypt's unchallenged leader?

There is no doubt, says Zahran, that the 12 August shake-up has weakened the military, and at a time when -- following the killing of 16 border guards -- its public standing had plummeted.

What seems clear, says Zahran, is that Mursi's moves against the military old guard were taken against a backdrop that included "an understanding between the president and other members of the military leadership".

According to Zahran, now that Mursi has picked his own military chief -- a general who supported the "virginity tests" of female protesters that activists and human rights groups denounced as sexual assault and an attempt to frighten women away from joining protests -- "the Islamist takeover of Egypt's military could be underway."

The suspicion, says Zahran, is that an agreement was struck between the Brotherhood and Tantawi and Anan. The two generals have been allowed a safe exit from power, with guarantees that they will face no prosecution for actions -- including the killing of hundreds of protesters during the period in which they were in charge of the country -- in return for helping the Brotherhood grab all the reins of state power.

"Now, with the army out of the political scene, secular forces -- including political activists and judges ?ê" must prepare themselves for a battle against Egypt's first Islamist pharaoh," says Salah Eissa, editor of the secular weekly Al-Qahera (Cairo).

View the original article here

This post was made using the Auto Blogging Software from WebMagnates.org This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.

Features: Few takers for 'bala'

As people start buying new clothes to celebrate the Eid Al-Fitr holiday, things have remained quiet in Port Said, writes Osama Kamal

The world of bala, a variation of the English word "bale", or trade in secondhand clothes, is as immense as it is labyrinthine. In the Suez Canal city of Port Said, a hotbed of the bala trade, customers can find all sorts of used-clothes shops on Al-Hamidi, Al-Tegari, Al-Rawda and Al-Amin streets, as well as in the area around Mawqaf Domyat and the area surrounding the train terminal.

However, while in the past Port Said was the favourite destination for many people wanting to buy clothes, whether new or secondhand, today shop owners in the city say they miss the good old days when people came in greater numbers and had more money to spend.

Probably the largest concentration of bala shops in the entire country is located on Al-Nasr Street in Port Said. The neighbourhood is officially known as "Al-Kuwait", in recognition of the fact that it was built by the Kuwaiti emir Sabbah Al-Salem following the 1973 War. However, members of the older generation still call it "Al-Qanal Al-Dakheli" (the Inner Canal) because it had a waterway running through it until 1982.

In 1994, the governor of the city moved merchants from Al-Tegari and Al-Hamidi streets to Al-Qanal Al-Dakheli, a decision based on the risk of fire in the overcrowded streets. Since then, Al-Qanal Al-Dakheli has become the land of bala. While customers for new clothes continued to shop in Al-Tegari and Al-Hamidi Streets, merchants dealing in secondhand clothes in Al-Qanal Al-Dakheli began to make a fortune.

Yet, where there were once fortunes to be made, today the mood is a despondent one. Hassan El-Etr, a shop owner in the area, says that business has been slow since the January 2011 Revolution, and things got worse after the football tragedy last February, in which Ahli fans were attacked after a match between the Ahli and Masri football clubs, resulting in the deaths of more than 70 and the injury of more than 1,000 people.

Fears of crime, robbery and car thefts in the city have all also worked to bring trade to a virtual standstill.

According to El-Etr, all classes, rich and poor, used to enjoy shopping for used clothes, since by no means all bala items are old. Many manufacturers getting rid of old stock may sell it as bala, and shoppers have often therefore been able to buy brand new items at cheap prices.

Even celebrities have come to the district looking for bargains, he says, giving the examples of singer Ahmed Adawiya and actor Mohamed Ragab, who bought clothes from nearby shops.

The most expensive item in El-Etr's clothing shop costs LE50 ($25), while the cheapest is LE10 ($1.5). The bala often comes from well-known centres in Europe, such as in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. The trade is highly organised, with workshops in Europe specialising in sorting out items of used clothes, most of them manned by Egyptian and Arab workers.

"It used to be the case that we would sometimes find pleasant surprises in the clothes, such as money or jewellery," El-Etr said. "But after the European sorting centres started employing Egyptians and Arabs, we no longer find anything."

A few stores away sits Ashraf Shanan, 43, the proud owner of Al-Kabatin, one of the biggest shops in the area. Shanan said that the bala trade started out as a kind of "social subsidy" from the European countries. The bala used to go to churches and charity organisations, but over time it turned into a commercial activity and various Port Said shops took it over.

The best-known shops for bala in Port Said are Khodeir, Qaddura and Al-Arabi Abu Sir, said Shanan, who often travels to Brussels, Antwerp and Liege in Belgium to buy supplies. He does his best to buy bala that contains a high percentage of designer clothes, such as Zara, Gucci and Victoria's Secret. Sometimes, he finds real gems -- perhaps an overcoat in good shape that could be worth up to LE1,000. In general, though, the items he sells range in price from LE5 to LE200 ($1 to $33).

Mohamed Abu Risha, 80, is one of the oldest bala traders in Port Said, and he looks like the living embodiment of Abul-Arabi, a folk hero of the city. "Abu Risha", which means "man with feather", acquired his nickname because he had a feathered hat on when he was interviewed on the popular radio show Ala Al-Nasia (In the Corner) in the 1960s.

"I started working in bala in the early days of the free trade zone in 1976," he says. "I made so much money that I bought two shops in Al-Rawda Street, though later I neglected the shops and went back to work as a bambuti [peddler operating from a small boat and trading with passing ships] and let the shops deteriorate."

According to Abu Risha, "the bala trade is like life. It is open to everyone, and brings happy surprises, as well as pain and sorrow."

This is a statement that Mohamed Alista, owner of a bala shop on Al-Nasr Street, also thinks is true. "Since the beginning of Ramadan, I haven't made a single sale. No one comes to the shop anymore," he complained.

Alista doubles as an actor whenever the opportunity comes his way, and he played a supporting role in Awlad Al-Leil, a television drama set in Port Said. He has also appeared in films like Abul-Arabi and Gharib Al-Dar (The Stranger), the events of which take place in the free zone.

"I have sold huge amounts of bala and made loads of money, but now I cannot make one penny from the trade. It drives me crazy to see so few people coming to Port Said these days," he said.

In Alista's view, the government should organise travel groups of shoppers to Port Said in order to help the city out of its economic fix.

Meanwhile, dozens of merchants sit in front of merchandise they have put out on the pavement in front of the train station. They are dreaming of the hundreds of visitors who used to come to the city on every train. Now the visitors are few, and the sales are fewer.

View the original article here

This post was made using the Auto Blogging Software from WebMagnates.org This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.