Features: Zewail versus students

After an 18-month delay, promises and counter-promises, the Nile University versus Zewail City of Science and Technology saga continues, writes Sarah Eissa Clockwise from top: the Nile University premises; the sit-in; a student cleaning up; during the construction phase; students say the NU name is all over the place even on sewer covers

Students at Egypt's private Nile University (NU) began an open-ended sit-in last Saturday, saying that they were prepared to continue their protest on the university's campus, which they are officially not allowed to enter, until their demands are met. The students said the sit-in, started when university authorities did not respond to them, was an act of last resort. They face an uncertain future since the land on which the Nile University sits was granted last year to Nobel Prize-winning Egyptian scientist Ahmed Zewail to establish the Zewail City of Science and Technology (ZCST).

Nile University is a non-profit, privately-owned and autonomously-managed institution of higher learning, founded in 2006. Students at the institution have been waiting to move in for some time to begin their studies, but have now been told that the ZCST will be using the university's buildings instead. According to the students, the decision on the university's future and to award the land and buildings to the ZCST instead was political motivated. Many parents, professors, clerks, other private and public university students, and some political forces support the sit-in, the students said.

In a statement at last weekend's press conference, the NU students said that despite the fact that they were engaged in a peaceful sit-in, thugs had been sent to attack them. When one of the students and a staff member had gone to the police to ask them to protect the sit-in, they were themselves detained, the students said, with the authorities demanding that the students either end the sit-in or risk continued detention. Six Central Security Forces (CSF) trucks had been seen outside university premises. An officer had asked for the students' names, in order to protect them, he claimed, but the students said that they were surprised to find that the officer reported to retired general Salah Azazi, security director of the ZCST.

At the press conference, the NU students said they were not against the Zewail project, but they did not want to see it take the place of NU. If they were allowed to keep the NU buildings, they would be willing to press the administration to host the Zewail project until the ZCST was able to find buildings of its own. In the meantime, they would not end the sit-in, the students said. After a year-and-a-half of broken promises from previous governments, they said they hoped the new government would support them, allowing NU to use the campus permanently.

During the press conference, students Mohamed Osama and Mustafa Shamaa, the latter a previous NU student union president, announced that they would be beginning a 48-hour hunger strike on Monday if no steps were taken. Shamaa said that the hunger strike was the only way that the students could find to make the government and public opinion pay attention to their plight.

In visits to the sit-in, Al-Ahram Weekly found the students apparently exhausted though enthusiastic about speaking about NU's problem. Ahmed Nassar, present NU Student Union president and a fourth-year computer-engineering student, said that for a year-and-a-half they had wanted to enter the university buildings, which had been built and equipped using university money and donations. However, they had not been able to do so because of decisions taken by former prime ministers Essam Sharaf and Ahmed Shafik, which had allowed the Zewail project to acquire the land, according to Nassar without due legal title.

Over the previous year-and-a-half, the students had protested the decision in front of the People's Assembly (PA), the prime minister's office and the Ministry of Higher Education, he said. With each new minister and prime minister they had made a new stand, also sending petitions to the former ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the prime minister in person. But all they had received were more promises, he said.

Ahmed Ismail, a research assistant in the software engineering track in the computer and information technology department at NU, said that Masters students would not be able to graduate because there was nowhere for them to put their equipment while the buildings were under legal guard. The equipment had to be kept in a Smart Village garage lab for the time being, he said, where students had been attending classes.

According to Mohamed Ghoneim, a member of the ZCST board of trustees, speaking to the Al-Hayat Al-Youm television programme, the NU students had never entered the university's premises. Ismail disagreed, saying that a graduation ceremony, science fair, and conferences had been held there in conjunction with the Menoufiya and Ain Shams universities. "There are 27 PDF files of photos proving that we have used the buildings," the students said, adding that there was even a scale model of the university on the NU campus. They said that not only had the ZCST tried to take the buildings from them, but it had also taken equipment, computers and books found inside the disputed buildings.

Ghoneim said that the NU board of trustees had surrendered the university's land and buildings to the Ministry of Higher Education and Ministry of Communication on 17 February 2011. In October, the land and buildings had been transferred to the ZCST. To avoid any problems, members of the ZCST administration had met with academic representatives of both universities and had decided to transfer all NU students, researchers and staff to the ZCST. Current students could choose to graduate from either NU or ZCST, he said, adding that it was not possible, however, for the two institutions formally to merge.

NU students Nassar and Ismail said that the intention was to kill NU slowly, inevitably bringing about its closure. Ismail was also concerned about NU workers, "there are more than 200 employees, and we do not want to see them lose their jobs. Transferring the students does not mean that the problem is solved," he said.

"It's an 'acquisition' not a merger," said Dina El-Agami, a fourth-year student in business. El-Agami is one of many students who will be travelling abroad on an exchange programme, and she was worried at the possibility of closure faced by NU. Anyone choosing to work or study at NU believes in the university's mission, she said, and they could not simply abandon the institution in favour of ZCST. Besides, she said, the ZCST project was vague and the institution's specialties were different from those at NU. Ismail and Nassar agreed, adding that Egypt needed both institutions equally.

NU president professor Tareq Khalil said that he had not surrendered the NU's land and buildings to ZCST. "Can anyone give up a university," he asked. "The university has an independent status and was established by presidential decree. No one can simply give it up," he said. In a previous interview with the Weekly, Khalil had explained that NU was established in 2006 as the only non-profit university in Egypt. Following the passage of Law 12/2009 allowing for the establishment of civil universities, the NU was approved in January 2011 by the Supreme Council for Civil and Private Universities. However, due to the 25 January Revolution, the presidential decree was never signed, he said.

This has left the university in the present legal problem, with Menna Syam, a research assistant in the Centre for Informatics, saying that the students were using two buildings in the Smart Village, for which the rent had not been paid. A new campus could not be built as long as the money spent on the present one had not been recouped, she said. Ismail added that over the previous five years, NU had accomplished many achievements, including student Haitham Desouki's winning first prize in the Stars of Science competition. It also had many more ambitious plans, including the development of pilotless airplanes and the application that had won the Google Ibdaa competition. The university also has joint projects with Microsoft and Google, he said.

According to students, there are around 300 post-graduate students at NU. More than 500 former students have graduated, and there are around 88 undergraduates, "Many students have applied to join NU, but have found no places available," El-Agami said. The university offers some 100 per cent scholarships, and Ismail said his scholarship paid him a salary as a researcher, showing that the university was not just for those able to afford its fees. Other scholarships are worth around 50 per cent of fees, he said, with all Masters students having scholarships.

According to Zewail, many professors have come to Egypt specifically to take part in the ZCST project, but Nassar said that professor Yehia Ismail, claimed by Zewail, had in fact been hired by NU. Ismail himself has said that he was employed by both institutions. For the students, Zewail has not shown that he has the right to the land for the ZCST, and they complain of his claiming the 127 acres used by NU. "I don't mind him taking the land, but he should give the buildings back to us," Ismail said. "He is just insisting because of the buildings, and it's not his right to do so," he added.

Ahmed Khalil, a fourth-year business student, commented that the university's server room can only be used by NU professors, as it uses fingerprint recognition. The NU logo was everywhere on campus, he said, even on the sewer covers. "Even the sewage manhole covers bear the university logo," said one of the university security guards, who supported the students' demands. The students had been peaceful in their protests, he said, and had not tried to storm the university.

University president Tareq Khalil said that there were now proposals to look into the issue again by committees of presidential advisors. Meanwhile, the students criticised the information on the controversy carried by some media outlets, showing the Weekly an issue of one state newspaper that they said had published lies about them.

For their part, supports of Zewail last Friday formed a human chain to support the ZCST on the Qasr Al-Nile bridge in Cairo. One of the participants said that they were dreaming of being able to register at Zewail's ZCST. "At first, we were not sure what we could do to support the project, but now we have decided to take active steps. If we do not learn in the ZCST, the next generations will be able to do so," she said.

She said that she did not believe that the NU students had the right to use the buildings. She did not oppose NU, she said, but she wanted to see the completion of ZCST. Why didn't people look towards a bigger dream, she asked, "a complete science city, not a university set up under the previous regime?"

Zewail had not taken the NU buildings, she added. The land had originally belonged to him, and after the Revolution he had been able to enforce his right to it. Ramy Isaac, Cairo coordinator of the Friends of Zewail group, refused to comment on the NU case and its relation to the Zewail project. The projects should not be discussed together, he said.

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Meet the new governors

Mohamed Abdel-Baky profiles the 10 officials whose names have been announced

On Tuesday, President Mohamed Mursi reshuffled some of his governors, appointing 19 new ones out of 27.

The upper hand in the reshuffle went to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) who received 40 per cent of the seats by appointing four governors. Three seats -- 30 per cent -- went to former military and police major generals. The remaining three new governors included a judge and two university professors.

For Kafr Al-Sheikh governorate, Mursi picked Saad El-Husseini, an engineer who has been a parliament member since 2005. El-Husseini is also a member of the political bureau of the MB and a member in the higher committee of its Freedom and Justice Party.

The new governor of Menoufiya, Mohamed Beshr, is also a member of the MB Guidance Council Bureau. Within the Muslim Brotherhood, Beshr was responsible for the group's activities in the Engineers Syndicates until 1997. From 1990-1995 he was the parliament member of Menoufiya's first district.

During the rule of former president Hosni Mubarak, Beshr and El-Husseini were detained several times. In 2006 they were prosecuted along with 40 other MB leaders on charges of joining an outlawed group that sought to overthrow the government.

Yehia Kishk, medical professor at the University of Assiut, was awarded the governor's post in Assiut. Kishk is a leading MB figure in Assiut and is said to have played a key role in mobilising Assiut residents to vote for Mursi during the presidential elections.

Mustafa Farghali, a leading MB figure in Minya and a professor at Minya University, was appointed governor of Minya.

Military and police generals were appointed for the border governorates of North Sinai, Red Sea and Suez.

General Sayed Harhour, former general of the military police, was appointed governor of North Sinai. General Mohamed Kamel, a major general in the engineering division in the military, was appointed for the Red Sea governorate. Major General Samir Aglan was chosen for Suez governorate.

For Cairo, Mursi picked Osama Kamal, a civil engineer who was Benha University's vice president for the last two years.

Judge Mohamed Atta Abbas, chosen for Alexandria governorate, was a deputy chief justice of Egypt Administrative Court.

Studies show that over the last two decades, 50 to 80 per cent of all governors appointed under Mubarak had military backgrounds. Some came from the police or other internal security bodies, such as the now-dissolved State Security Apparatus.

"It is the same way the old regime reshuffled the governors... nothing new, neither people with a military background nor official from the ruling party," said political analyst Mustafa Kamel El-Sayed.

El-Sayed noted that the selection of the new governors was not based on standards of competence, as most of the new governors do not have backgrounds related to local development.

"For example in Suez, people are against changing the governor who enjoyed popularity among the majority of people there. Nobody even consulted the local leaders there of who should be their next governor, it is the same policy that Mubarak used," he added.

According to Amr Hashem Rabei, an expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, the Muslim Brotherhood is planning to install its members as governors to restore the popularity they lost after the presidential election.

"I think they plan on getting at least 13 governorates before the parliament election, a step they think might improve their popularity," Rabei argued.

Rabei added that it is clear that Mursi is allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to dominate all national institutions, reproducing the old National Democratic Party (NDP).

After the 25 January Revolution, governors were reshuffled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and former prime minister Essam Sharaf, who changed 18 out of the 27 governors. Sharaf changed the governors once again in August 2011 replacing 11 of them and moving one governor to another governorate. Five new army and police generals were also appointed.

Minister of Local Development Ahmed Abdine said on Tuesday that he discussed with various political forces the governors reshuffle which appears part of a wider strategy the president is adopting to reform local and regional authorities.

He added that the second step in this reform plan is to hold municipal council elections directly after parliamentary elections, and that their electoral system would be determined by the new local development law.

Former prime minister Kamal El-Ganzouri, now a consultant of the president, announced in February that his cabinet was working on amendments to the local development law to give the council a more active role and wider powers which could include monitoring governors and other officials.

Egypt is divided into 27 governorates and 199 city councils. Each city has its own municipal council.

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Religion and foreign policy

When religion defines foreign policy it will inevitably clash with national interests, creating the grounds for wars that only elites who rule in the name of religion win, writes Gamil Matar

That Egypt's president cites Quranic verses and uses religious phrases in his public addresses does not surprise me. If we are accustomed from an early age to using them in our school compositions, there is nothing inherently odd in the president peppering his speeches with them, especially given that he is a religious man and a prominent member of an Islamist organisation that elevated him to his current office. Nevertheless, I must confess that I was taken aback by the prologue to the speech he delivered at a recent conference in Iran and in which he made mention of the companions of the Prophet and cited a verse from the Quran. Something about that prologue did not ring true. It's intent was consummately political and it conveyed the sense of a future policy orientation, which may well have been the intent of the speechwriters.

The conference in which this speech was delivered was the last summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This movement is made up of numerous member states whose peoples have diverse religious affiliations. What bound these states together from the outset and protects them to this day as a non-aligned grouping is a set of political principles and interests that have no direct bearing on religion.

Clearly, the political point of employing religious references in a speech at a conference in which religion was not on the agenda was to deliver a "religious" message or, more accurately, a sectarian message to the host people, which in this case were the Iranians. I doubt that such a message could ever have been delivered in the era of NAM's founding fathers or in any of the subsequent conferences. Nothing in the substance of this message addressed a single one of that set of principles established by the conferences of Bandung and Belgrade and that set the course for generation after generation of Third World leaders and diplomats for the next 60 years.

Of course, our president was hardly the first political leader to use religious language for political ends. History is filled with accounts of the practice of mixing religion with politics in order to promote narrow interests or ambitious policies. Perhaps the architects of Western colonial policies set world records in the use of religion to accomplish imperial ends. History is similarly full of stories in which religion and politics are blended in order to evangelise or spread a religious calling, or to instil noble morals and ethics in international political practices. As we know, there are long-established schools in international relations that specialise in the connection between politics and ethics, and also power.

The stories abound and their conclusions and consequences are varied. Certainly no Arab or Muslim will forget the story of President George W Bush when he deliberately inserted the word "crusade" in his televised speech on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq. I recall that at the time many international affairs specialists anticipated the onset of an age in which religion would interweave with international relations to a degree unprecedented in modern history. Their prediction came true. To read the political studies and minutes of Congressional hearing sessions of this period one would think that American scholars, politicians and diplomats had begun to regard religion as a state enterprise.

What this means is that US diplomacy can use religion to further US national interests. It does this through the application of the "religion by proxy" theory, which holds that people place their faith in the hands of a religious ruling minority that represents or claims to represent the pious majority. There are many testimonies to this transformation in US foreign policy design. Take, for example, how the US has changed its approach to religious movements in various parts of the world. The rule in US diplomacy used to be that since the US constitution insists on the separation of church from state, US diplomats should avoid dealing with religious parties and leaderships even if the aim is to further US interests. This rule vanished with the collapse of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York in September 2001. From then onward, US statesmen and diplomats made it their business to deal with foreign religious parties and political forces, as well as to furnish all possible support to Christian evangelistic groups and organisations which became more energetic than ever in their campaigns to spread their ideas in South America, Africa and China.

In short, the US now began to follow in the heels of the erstwhile European colonial powers, when the imperialistic drive donned a religious mantle and blazoned the fiction of the Christian civilising mission in order to justify the occupation of the continents of the South and the East for the purpose of plundering their national resources and reducing their peoples to subjugation. Some people claim that the US added other pretexts to that flagrantly religious mission, namely the missions to spread democracy and human rights and liberties, and that sometimes it jumbled the lot of them together.

Others make a distinction between how the Europeans and how the Americans use religion in foreign policy. For example, Javier Solana, the former EU foreign affairs commissioner, warned against the danger of the American use of religion in foreign policy. The Americans are "absolutists," he said. Everything to them is either black or white, good or evil, with us or against us. Therefore, he argued, it is hard for them to be tolerant with other peoples or other religions, unlike the Europeans who had learned over centuries the true meaning of religious hatreds. Because the Europeans had had to pay a horrific toll for their religious wars, they eventually became among the most tolerant people on earth and the most accepting of the "other," which today is reflected in their foreign policies, or so argue the defenders of the properties of European culture and policy.

A foreign policy academy in the US has cautioned that the mixing religion with politics can frequently give rise to the "hijacking of religion". Unethical political leaders may take advantage of -- or feel compelled by -- certain circumstances to use religion as a cover for the pursuit of personal ends or for promoting narrow partisan interests. There are also many instances of political leaders who drew on religious passions to turn their people against other peoples, which only serves to make conflicts much more complex and intractable.

Others have been prompted by developments in their own countries or societies to warn against excessive blending of religion and politics. It is natural for different communities living side-by-side to fall into dispute and for disputes to erupt into violence. It is equally natural for local authorities to seize the opportunity to diffuse the situation before it spirals out of control, even before central authorities become aware of the situation. But in this day and age of ours, local disputes are increasingly becoming a cause of general concern because they offer an opening for foreign powers to meddle on the pretext of protecting a minority sect or ethnic group, and because the foreign meddling often causes the disputes to escalate into civil strife or even civil war. I am not sure of the scale of injustice being inflicted on the Muslims of Burma. Perhaps it is of a degree that merits such worldwide attention and international intervention. However, I am certain that other Muslims in northeastern India and in Bangladesh, itself, which is a Muslim nation, are the victims of grave injustices, while the "international community" remains unconcerned.

In all events, with Burma, as in many other cases, religion is being used to serve the "national" interests of other countries, in spite of the well-known "cost" of this practice, which is exorbitant and usually very bloody. This is not to say that the international community should stop supporting oppressed groups in Sankyang, Tibet, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and in many Arab and Islamic countries. Rather, the point is that the intervention should avoid inflaming the religious sensitivities of the peoples concerned. As history has shown, this practice has often created the soil upon which groups that originally existed on the fringes of society could develop into mass religious or sectarian movements with transnational dimensions. Or, more dangerously, it sparked the rise of terrorist groups that wrought fear, destruction and chaos and some of which were enlisted into the intelligence agencies of some governments in order to perform these governments' dirty work in other countries.

In certain quarters there is this assumption that communities or peoples that share the same religious affiliation rarely fight or engage in war. In my opinion, this theory is just as fallacious as the famous one that holds that democratic countries never make war on one another. As many international politics experts will tell you, the prime engine of the foreign policy of any state is national interest. The idea was first formulated by the father of the science of international relations, Hans Morgenthau, and the overwhelming majority of political scientists and statesmen still subscribe to it. Some of these go on to assert that the goal of realising national interests sometimes gives politicians the incentive to pursue actions that defy ethical principles. The eminent political scientist Arthur Schlesinger coined a now famous term for this phenomenon. He called it the "necessary immorality" in the manufacture of foreign policy.

This concept brings us to an inescapable reality. "Religious states" go to war just as "secular states" do and "religious states" can become embroiled in gruelling wars with other "religious states", including those that share the same religion and even the same religious denomination. The history of the Middle East, since the dawn of religion, is filled with religious wars, some of which lasted decades and left disastrous and long-lasting effects. Otherwise put, when religion enters into the equation as a shaper of foreign policy, it will inevitably clash with the chief engine of foreign policy, which is national interest. The winners in this game are never the people and the advancement of their societies, but only the elites who claim to rule in the name of religion and who will have no compunction about going on the warpath against other ruling elites who are their coreligionists in another country. There is an endless train of such wars, from the eras of the Islamic caliphates in Damascus, Baghdad and Istanbul, to the clash in Europe between the eastern and western Christian empires. In the Arab and Islamic world, alone, we have had the wars between Egypt and Yemen, Libya and Chad, Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq and Iran, the Turks and the Persians, and western Pakistan and eastern Pakistan or the "land of the Bengals."

The forced or artificial mixture of religion and foreign policies is fraught with risks, especially when the political elites who forge the policy decisions or orientations are "religious" in their political orientation or definition of their identity.

The writer is a political analyst and director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.

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New era spawns more parties

Many new parties have been joining the political scene, but how effective are they likely to be, asks Mohamed Abdel-Baky

Over the last week, two political groups that helped to spark the 25 January Revolution have decided to join the political scene by forming political parties ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Supporters of opposition figure Mohamed El-Baradei are in the process of forming the Constitution Party, after presenting the registration papers last week. At the same time, a dissident camp within the April 6 Youth Movement, the Democratic Front, announced its intention of launching a new political party to represent the country's revolutionary youth.

On 29 August, hundreds of El-Baradei's supporters along with the Constitution Party's founders headed to the Higher Judiciary House to present the Political Parties Commission with the signatures of the party's 10,700 founders and the documents required to register the new party.

The political parties law requires any new political party to have at least 5,000 founders' signatures before it can be officially registered.

Hundreds of party members wore white t-shirts with the word "Constitution" scrawled on them, waving banners proclaiming that "the Constitution Party is for all Egyptians."

Prominent members of the party were also present, including Emad Abu Ghazi, a former minister of culture, Gamila Ismail, a former member of the Ghad Party, George Ishaq, an activist and founder of the Kifaya Movement, and two members of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, Shadi El-Ghazali Harb and Nasser Abdel-Hamid.

In April, El-Baradei announced the imminent formation of the Constitution Party in order for it to compete in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

"The aim of this party is to save the 25 January Revolution, which has been derailed and almost aborted, and to restore unity," El-Baradei said at the time.

"When the revolution started, we never imagined that things could reach this stage, or that we would be living in this tragic transitional period," he said.

The Constitution Party marks a return to public life for El-Baradei, who declared in January that he would not run for the presidency during a "scrambled transition period".

El-Baradei, a former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, returned to Egypt to a hero's welcome in 2010, the year before the 25 January Revolution that led to the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak.

Party leaders said that there were now more than 50,000 members across Egypt, covering different ages, genders and educational levels.

"We have thousands of university and school students who are willing to play a role on campus once the school year begins," said Samir El-Sayed, a journalist and one of the founding members of the party.

He added that party leaders were keen on attracting as many young people as they could, encouraging them to join in the political process.

However, experts raised questions about the ability of the newly formed party to build grassroots support before the parliamentary elections, bearing in mind that it has not yet held internal elections to choose its leadership and those who would run the electoral campaign.

"I think the Constitution Party will face the same problems that the other non-Islamist parties have, namely a lack of organisational structure," said Dina Samak, a political analyst.

Samak cited the Egyptian Social Democratic Party as an example. This was founded in March 2011 with more than 38,000 registered members. However, the party has not been able to make an impact on nationwide events, such as national elections.

Ahmed Darag, a co-founder of the Constitution Party, said that it would focus on establishing a network of supporters across Egypt and finding local leaders to lead the party at the grassroots.

Up until now, according to its official Facebook page, the party has branches in 26 governorates. Most party members are young people from the El-Baradei Presidential Support Campaign, a youth movement formed to support El-Baradei in running for the presidency against Mubarak before the 25 January Revolution.

Darag said that the party had plans to work intensively outside the capital in order to build a network of supporters.

"Our contacts with the people will not be limited to election time. We plan to be in contact all the time in order not to lose public trust," Darag said.

The party has already begun to work in community activities, starting with last week's rallies against sexual harassment and organising charity markets for clothes in poorer areas.

Party members in Upper Egyptian governorates have paid visits to churches to congratulate worshippers on special occasions of the Christian calendar.

The party is viewed by experts as a liberal party, though the party's mission statement avoids mention of any specific ideology.

"We are a centrist party, and we want to build a country with a democratic system that fulfils the goals of the 25 January Revolution, namely bread, freedom and social justice," the mission statement says.

Speaking to the media last week, party spokesperson Emad Abu Ghazi said that the party adopted "reformist ideas in general" and that it did not want to be categorised as liberal or leftist.

"We are a party that wants to see democratic reforms to build the new Egypt. We believe that we have to be in the middle, like most Egyptians," Ghazi said.

One senior member of the party told Al-Ahram Weekly that the party's leaders wanted to avoid talking about ideology at this stage, in order not to alienate any segment of society.

"In the last parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis spread rumours that the liberal parties were supported by the US and the Coptic Church in order to scare voters. This strategy worked to some degree, and we do not want to risk a re-run of the same scenario," he said.

Together with the Constitution Party, the 6 April Movement's Democratic Front announced that it will transform itself into a political party in order to fight the forthcoming elections.

"After a year of discussion, the majority of movement members have decided to create a political party in order to play a stronger role in politics after the transition period," the movement said in a statement on its Facebook page.

Movement leader Tareq El-Kholi said that transforming the movement into a political party would legitimise its status, allowing it to collect funds from donors, hold public rallies and be accountable to government auditing agencies.

"This party is being created in order to represent the youth of this country, who led the revolution," El-Kholi said, pledging to make Egypt into a democratic country.

Political experts expect that the youth movements that sparked the revolution will lose momentum following the transfer of power to a civilian president.

The 6 April Movement failed to attract the numbers the Kifaya Movement mobilised in 2005 during its campaign against the constitutional amendments proposed by the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), for example.

Internal divisions over the movement's future began to surface in May 2011, leading to the formation of a splinter group, the 6 April Movement Democratic Front, led by El-Kholi, while the main group, still named 6 April, was led by founder Ahmed Maher.

The movement has failed to regain its position at the forefront of events since the split.

In a related development, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party held its annual elections last Friday, most members re-electing Mohamed Abul-Ghar as chair of the party.

Abul-Ghar told party members on Friday that the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to control the next parliament along with the presidency. He called upon all non-Islamist parties to work together to create balance in the political system.

He said the party would start a process of internal reform and work intensively on the ground to be more engaged with the public.

The party has a liberal and social democratic outlook and was politically active in the years preceding the revolution. However, since then it has been unable to compete with the Islamist parties like the Salafist Nour Party and the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party at a grassroots level.

In the last parliamentary elections, the party fielded 80 candidates in the Egyptian Bloc Coalition, but managed to secure just 16 seats.

Observers say that the diversity of political and economic orientations in the party has limited its cohesion. Following the last internal elections, a group of members that helped found the party announced their resignation, saying that the party had failed to reach out to the public and had turned into an intellectual talking shop.

"Every day, the organisational and political problems of the party have been increasing," the group said, criticising the party leadership for not communicating with local leaders and closing local party offices.

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Mursi beyond Tehran

In the Iranian capital and in Cairo, Dina Ezzat deciphers President Mursi's Iran visit, its intentions and possible outcomes Mursi (r)attended the NAM summit with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Iranian chief of Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in Tehran

"It is still early to talk about specifics regarding Egyptian-Iranian relations," said Yasser Ali, the Egyptian presidential spokesman.

Ali was speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly as President Mohamed Mursi was exiting the meeting room at the Tehran Conference Hall where he had conferred with his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for around 40 minutes, following the participation of both in the opening session of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran Thursday, whereby Mursi transferred the rotated presidency of the summit from Egypt to Iran.

According to Ali's statement to the Weekly and that of Ambassador Alaa Youssef, the head of Egypt's Interest Section in Iran, and of Ambassador Moatez Ahmadine, Egypt's permanent representative to the UN headquarters in New York, the venue of the NAM Secretariat, Mursi's brief visit to Tehran on his way back from Beijing was by and large multilateral with not much bilateral input.

"Of course, there were good exchanges of courteous statements and an emphasis by President Ahmadinejad on the respect that Iran has for Egypt and its great people, and its great [25 January] revolution. Of course Egyptian President Mursi, in turn, expressed respect for Iran and its history and its role, but we cannot say that bilateral relations were really discussed," commented an Iranian official who took part in the Mursi-Ahmadinejad encounter.

He added that eventually the time would come for that, because ultimately "what the two nations, these two great nations, have in common is much bigger than their differences."

The visit of Mursi to Tehran, which started late morning and ended early afternoon, is the first such high-level visit by an Egyptian official to Tehran after it severed its relations with Egypt in 1979 at a time of the establishment of the Islamic Republic, when refuge was offered by then Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat to Iran's ousted Shah, and against the backdrop of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Since that time, relations between Cairo and Tehran went from cold to hostile. Differences between the two countries grew with the time from mere political differences over the management of the Arab-Israeli struggle to differences over the Islamist rule of Iran versus relatively secular rule in Egypt, and of Sunni versus Shia leadership in the Middle East, especially during the years of war between Iran and Iraq, then under the leadership of president Saddam Hussein, in the late 1980s.

The visit of Mursi to Tehran this week, as head of the Egyptian delegation to the NAM summit, was hoped by many to signal the end of these differences and to initiate a new rapprochement that could eventually lead to the normalisation of relations -- something that was attempted by former foreign minister Amr Moussa under the rule of Hosni Mubarak in the late 1990s, but that he did not successfully pull off, according to Egyptian diplomats, due to Mubarak's hesitation and US influence over his foreign policy choices.

None of the aspired to change happened, according to almost identical accounts offered by Egyptian and Iranian officials, during Mursi's brief visit to Tehran. Rather the contrary could well be true, some officials say.

Mursi received huge media attention upon his arrival to Imam Khomeini International Airport and upon his departure from the Tehran Conference Hall. It is also true that Mursi referred to his Iranian counterpart as "my dear brother" during the opening of the summit. Following the visit of Mursi, the Iranian president also told the Iranian official press that, "Egyptians and Iranians have so much in common."

However, beyond this symbolism there is very little to be said in terms of substance on a positive outcome of Mursi's visit to Tehran from a bilateral perspective.

Mursi was not at all sensitive, in the assessment of Iranian individuals who spoke to the Weekly in Tehran, over Shia reluctance to the mention of some of the Prophet Mohamed's associates in his ultra-Islamic greeting at the beginning of what was otherwise a political speech in the opening of the NAM summit.

"May God's peace and prayers be upon the Prophet Mohamed and his sahabah (close associates) Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali and that of the Holy Family of the Prophet," Mursi said at the onset of his speech.

While the mention of the last, Ali and the Holy Family of the Prophet, falls squarely within the bounds of predominantly Shia Iran appreciation, the reference to the first three is all but a taboo according to the Shia sect.

According to one of Mursi's aides, the reference in its totality was designed to indicate the need to go beyond the barriers of division in Muslim history between those that Shias appreciate and those appreciated by Sunnis, the predominant Muslim sect in Egypt.

This might have been the intention, but Mursi's interlocutors were certainly offended. According to one Iranian official who asked not to be named, this introductory paragraph in the speech of Mursi acted as a reminder of statements that the Egyptian president had earlier made in Saudi Arabia where he spoke in an untypical fashion for an Egyptian head of state on Egyptian-Saudi determination to defend the Sunni sect.

According to an Egyptian diplomat who accompanied Mursi during the visit to Saudi Arabia in early July, that Sunni emphasis "came out of nowhere" and it was not introduced or advised by diplomatic aides to the president, nor had it ever been part of Egyptian political jargon.

"I remember back in 2004 when [ousted president] Mubarak made a reference in a TV interview to the attempt of Iranian Shias to get in alliance with the Shia majority in Iraq, the [Egyptian] Foreign Ministry strongly advised against this line. Egypt does not identify itself as a Sunni state but as a leading Arab Muslim state," the diplomat said.

The ultra-Muslim stance and specific Sunni identification that Mursi seemed to be proposing in his speech before NAM was not just offending to the Iranians. It was also perceived as unfortunate back home in Egypt.

"This is a really disturbing remark," suggested Amin Iskandar, a Nasserist politician and member of the Arab Affairs Committee in the dissolved People's Assembly.

"The introduction of Mursi's speech is not becoming of that of the president of Egypt. Why talk about Sunni versus Shia matters in the onset of a political speech before an international organisation? What was the purpose? Was Mursi trying to reposition Egypt as an Islamist state now?" asked Iskandar.

He added: "Egypt had never been trapped in the Sunni-Shia polarisation game and it should not be doing so today, and not ever, because that goes against its regional leadership interests and consequently against its national security interests."

For his part, prominent political scientist and commentator Amr El-Shobaki, who generally held a positive view of Mursi's trip to Iran, argued that the Sunni versus Shia component in the speech before NAM was uncalled for and unfortunate.

"Egypt is not a radical Sunni state; Egypt is a state of a very moderate Sunni majority that has an affinity to the Holy Family and has as such a very unique nature to its Sunni Islam. Egypt through Al-Azhar University has always played a leading role in bridging the gap between Sunnis and Shias and it should not be abandoning this crucial mission, which is not only religious but indeed cultural and strategic," El-Shobaki added.

If some were offended by the Sunni aspect in Mursi's speech, others were perturbed by what they qualified as the "Muslim Brotherhood policy line" they said Mursi put across in the speech.

"When the Egyptian president spoke against Damascus he was, I am afraid, reflecting his perspective as a leading Muslim Brotherhood figure and not as that of the president of what is supposed to be a leading Arab state," commented Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallim, who headed the delegation of his country to the NAM summit.

In his speech, Mursi crossed borders he had personally embraced with regards to the Egyptian position on the Syrian file. Mursi used to speak of the need for the legitimate demands of the Syrian people for democratisation to be observed and for bloodshed to come to an end. In Tehran, the Egyptian president surprised his hosts, the closest regional allies to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, with an unprecedented attack on the Syrian regime for its actions during 18-month plus protests-turned-armed confrontations.

Mursi qualified the Al-Assad regime as an "oppressive regime" and insisted that it had "lost legitimacy". Indeed, the president equated the Syrian people under Al-Assad with the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation.

"This was the talk of a member of the Muslim Brotherhood," restated Al-Muallim.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria are particularly active within the ranks of an otherwise diversified Syrian opposition that emerged in March 2011 demonstrations to end the rule of the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot, that has headed Syria from the 1970s until today.

Iskandar too was critical of what he qualified as Muslim Brotherhood influence over the position that Mursi expressed with regards to Syria. "We are all appreciative of the legitimate and overdue demand of the Syrians for democracy. There are no two ways about it. However, it is impossible for anyone to equate the regime of Al-Assad, despite the horrid bloodshed in Syria, with the Israeli occupation of Palestine," Iskandar said.

According to Iskandar, "had Mursi been really concerned about the call for freedom and democracy he should have also made a reference to the call for democracy in Bahrain," where the Shia majority has for over a year been protesting against persecution at the hands of Sunni minority rule.

"For Mursi, it is not a matter of defending freedom but rather a matter of defending the Muslim Brotherhood perspective and associations," Iskandar suggested. He added that this line is compatible with the foreign policy agenda of Qatar, "that has an increasing influence over Egyptian foreign policy," adding that "Qatar is a regional proxy for the US."

During his visit to Tehran, President Mursi had a brief encounter with the emir of Qatar who had just visited Egypt mid-August. "The Qataris are opposed to the regime of Al-Assad, but not to the persecution of Shia in Bahrain, and Mursi spoke about Syria under the pretext of defending freedoms but completely dropped Bahrain," Iskandar criticised.

Indeed, the Iranian interpreter who was translating Mursi's speech into Persian was said, according to Iranian journalists, to have played around with his translation. In converting Mursi's speech into Persian, the Iranian interpreter pinned the attack made by the Egyptian president on the Bahraini rather than the Syrian regime.

Nonetheless, many Egyptian politicians and commentators had a positive reaction to Mursi's statements on Syria. "It was an overdue support," El-Shobaki said.

According to El-Shobaki, it is reductionist to suggest that the Egyptian position expressed by Mursi in Tehran is an outcome of Qatari influence over Egyptian foreign policy. "This is absolutely exaggerated," he said. El-Shobaki made reference to the criticism that the majority of Egyptian political quarters expressed against what they qualified as Mursi's "hesitant and flat positions on Syria".

"In Tehran, the president should have acknowledged the Bahraini call for democracy, but his failure to do so does not mean that he should have also overlooked a very bloody situation in Syria, especially that the support for the Syrian revolution is widely sensed not just in Egyptian political circles but indeed in the Egyptian street," El-Shobaki suggested.

According to Amr Ramadan, deputy assistant foreign minister, Mursi had already called for a political end to the crisis in Syria. During his participation in the extraordinary summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held two weeks ago in Mecca, at the invitation of the Saudi monarch, Mursi called for the launch of a working group of the OIC to help find resolution to the situation in Syria.

In Tehran, on Thursday, and Friday when the summit closed, Ramadan added, Egypt was supportive of a resolution that the NAM meeting adopted to welcome the mission of the new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi.

"What we opposed was an Iranian proposal to start a NAM working group on Syria, and our rationale there was simple: there are already several mechanisms and what is needed now is the coordination of efforts rather than the launch of a parallel mediation process," Ramadan suggested.

At the end of the day, both Ramadan and El-Shobaki agree that what Mursi did in essence with his remarks in Syria during the NAM summit was to substantiate Egypt's commitment to take a clear stance on the matter.

Indeed, in the analysis of El-Shobaki, the clear outcome of the Mursi visit to Tehran is the re-launching of Egyptian foreign policy.

Mursi in his speech also departed from the traditional reconciliatory line that Egypt had for the past 10 years embraced on the Palestinian cause. The president voiced direct and untypical criticism of Israel and highlighted previously overlooked matters, like the fate of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.

"This file is a crucial matter on the agenda of NAM. It had received much attention during the Egyptian presidency of the NAM summit and it is recommended as a priority issue in the transfer report that Egypt made during the handover of the presidency of the summit," Ramadan argued.

Moreover, the NAM summit made a commitment to support the diplomatic and political attempts to get Palestine permanent and full membership in the UN, in view of the failure of the so-called "peace process" to lead to a Palestinian state.

"Of course this mobilisation, in which Egypt is playing a key role, is not at all to the liking of the Israelis and they are endlessly complaining about it," the same diplomat suggested.

Egyptian diplomats who spoke on condition of anonymity said that the mere participation of Mursi in a Tehran-hosted summit is in itself a clear message to Israel that Egypt is no longer hostage to what makes Israel comfortable or not.

"We were told clearly that the Israelis are feeling very apprehensive about this visit, even when they knew that it was not designed to re-launch diplomatic relations immediately," said one diplomat.

Alarm against Mursi's visit to Tehran was sounded also in Washington. "There was much pressure, but it was declined," the same diplomat added.

According to Ramadan, the decision of Egypt to participate at this high level was made in view of the reclaimed attention that Egypt is giving to its role in the Third World.

"In a sense, the decision was made irrespective of the venue of the summit. NAM might not be making as much commotion as it used to during the heydays when it was first launched with the support, and indeed initiative, of [late president Gamal] Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s, but ultimately it is a grouping that brings together about two thirds of UN member states," Ramadan said.

He added that the issues on the agenda of NAM, which range from international conflicts to disarmament and economic and environmental cooperation, fall squarely within the list of priorities of Egyptian foreign policy.

And the fact that Mursi went to Tehran, El-Shobaki argued, opens a new phase of Egyptian foreign policy by which Egypt would not restrict itself to communication with the countries it sees eye-to-eye with.

"The president went to Tehran in a positive sign of goodwill. But while there he did not shy away from expressing disagreements between Cairo and Tehran. This is the way things should be," El-Shobaki said.

The shaking and remaking of Egyptian foreign policy seems to be a priority for Mursi. The president, who repeatedly committed to observe the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and who is as yet acting in line with the close alliance between Cairo and Washington, is venturing into a wider spectrum and a more diversified sphere of communication.

Ahead of his short and controversial visit to Tehran, Mursi had been in Beijing. For October, he is planning visits to Malaysia and Indonesia, whose vice president he met while in Tehran. He is also considering a trip to Brazil and Chile, which will possibly come in the wake of his visit to New York during the last week of this month to head the Egyptian delegation to the UN General Assembly.

The South America and Asian trips are in parallel with plans to visit European capitals that Egypt keeps in close relation with.

"If Egypt is aiming to reassume its leadership it needs to take clear positions on key matters and to widen its scope of foreign policy engagement. I think Mursi is attempting to do both," El-Shobaki concluded.

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Odd bedfellows

The United States and the Muslim Brotherhood are not as far apart as they can sometimes seem, writes Bassem Hassan

The Egyptian presidential race kept many people on their toes in anticipation of the changes it would bring, among others things to Egyptian-American relations. But two months after President Mohamed Mursi was sworn in, it is more or less business as usual. American officials are still welcome in Cairo, where they exchange compliments with their Egyptian counterparts and now also with the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders. For his part, Mursi is packing for his first trip to Washington. Both anxieties about, and hopes for, a major change in Egyptian-American relations have been misplaced, based on the rhetoric of the Brotherhood and of American officials.

Less attention has been paid to the long history of cooperation between the United States and Sunni Muslim conservative regimes and groups. Statements meant for the appeasement of domestic constituencies aside, the American-Sunni conservative alliance has been one of the most enduring features of politics in the Arab and Muslim worlds. In fact, America's entry to the Arab world in 1945 was through Saudi Arabia, the chief patron of Sunni-conservatism in the Arab world. In the post-World War II world, both America and Sunni conservatives found common enemies in nationalist leaders such as former presidents Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Egypt and Sukarno in Indonesia.

Then came the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The United States, the Saudis, the Pakistanis and Sunni Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, generously chipped in to this inter-faith project against the infidel communists that had taken over Afghanistan. Many believed that the events of 9/11 were some type of closure to this not-so-secret love affair. However, they were wrong, as America quickly re-established it: as US journalist Seymour Hersh revealed in The New Yorker magazine a few years ago, the two reunited to confront the Syria-Hizbullah-Iran alliance, and after Israel's failure to destroy Hizbullah in Lebanon, Washington decided to put its money on Sunni-conservatism instead.

The cooperation between America and its allies in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and various jihadist groups to topple the Syrian regime, now denoted as Alawi rather than pan-Arab or socialist as part of the manufacturing of a new terminology that fits the current confrontation better, is just the latest manifestation of this renewed partnership. Even Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has felt it was time to reconnect with his roots and to abandon his previous partnership plans with Syria and Iran.

During the brief breakup following the events of 9/11, cooperation between America and Sunni-conservatism did not come to a complete halt, as evinced by the collaboration between Iraqi politician Tareq Al-Hashimi's Islamic Party and the American occupation authorities in Iraq. Hence, when it comes to exploring the prospects of Egyptian-American relations a good place to start is by examining the interests of the Brotherhood and the United States, rather than looking at their public statements. After all, politicians, including pious brethren, tend to lie whenever it is expedient for them to do so.

For some time to come the Brotherhood in Egypt will have only one goal: to stay in power. Other political groups, with the possible exception of the Salafis, lack the means to challenge them in any upcoming elections. Using the state machinery, now under their control, the Brotherhood will try to ensure that this situation does not change anytime soon. This leaves them with two hurdles to climb over: Egypt's collapsed economy and the military.

The latter still has the capacity to significantly influence the outcome of the political process in this country, the brethren's jubilation following the recent changes in its leadership notwithstanding. America's support is also crucial to overcoming these challenges. Fortunately for the Brotherhood, America is more than willing to help since its main interests in Egypt -- the Suez Canal, the treaty with Israel, the establishment of a pluralist political system, the deeper integration of Egypt in the globalised capitalist system and the maintenance of close relations with the army -- are not threatened by the Brotherhood's ascendancy. Quite the contrary: the brethren could serve these interests.

The Brotherhood could bestow on US-favoured neo-liberal policies and the American-Egyptian alliance two types of legitimacy, one electoral and one religious. The Sadat-Mubarak regime failed to accomplish this, and the liberal parties supported by the business community are not up to the job. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, seems more than willing to play ball. It long ago abandoned the anti-capitalist spirit espoused by some of its ideologues in the mid-20th century. Its current leadership includes ardent free-market supporters like Khairat El-Shater and Hassan Malik. The latter, as the US magazine Businessweek aptly put it, can "easily blend in with the Wall Street crowd".

The current debate about a future IMF loan to Egypt is also quite revealing in this respect. A few years ago Mursi, then an MP, slammed such loans as un-Islamic. Ironically, today he is touting an IMF loan as his first economic achievement. American visitors who frequented the Brotherhood's headquarters after the fall of former president Hosni Mubarak must have realised that they see eye-to-eye with the brethren when it comes to the economy. In contrast, Ahmed Shafik, Mursi's competitor in the elections, expressed a commitment to the role of the state in the economy. In so doing, he was in line with the traditional view of the military, which averted the privatisation of the main state-owned banks in Egypt in the past. The military itself also runs what could be considered to be an "informal public sector" that has so far evaded the IMF. These assets are a coveted prize for the Brotherhood, which did not share in the spoils of the privatisations carried out under Mubarak.

The Brotherhood and the United States also share an interest in curtailing the political influence of the army. The former's reasons are quite obvious; the latter's require some elaboration. The United States has what is best described as a love-hate relationship with the Egyptian military. On the one hand, it is its main weapons supplier and training provider, a position that it is planning to maintain. On the other hand, it is not in favour of the army's economic role in Egypt and is concerned about its political intentions.

It suffices, in this respect, to highlight the fact that the military made a series of decisions that alarmed Washington more than the Brotherhood's rhetoric, for instance by allowing Iranian warships to pass through the Suez Canal, closing down major American NGOs in Cairo, terminating gas sales to Israel and ending the Gaza blockade. Establishing a pluralist political system consisting of pro-capitalism parties, a Western-funded civil society and a corporate media would be the most efficient means to contain the army's influence in Egypt. Needless to say, the Brotherhood would also benefit from any such arrangement.

Only one thorny issue remains: relations with Israel. Yet, even here the difference is about appearance rather than substance. Mursi has repeatedly declared his intention to respect Egypt's international agreements, including the treaty with Israel. During the presidential campaign, some of his supporters went as far as to consider abiding by the treaty to be a religious obligation as long as Israel also respected it. Moreover, Mursi has been keen to avoid any discussion of the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs), the most outstanding manifestation of economic normalisation with Israel. The Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv has not been recalled, and the Israeli flag is still flying in Cairo's skies. Most importantly, the Egyptian army, which according to the brethren is now under Mursi's full control, is coordinating its current campaign in Sinai with Israel.

The fact that Mursi wants to keep these positions off the radar to appease his domestic and regional constituencies is quite understandable; hence, his aides' frantic denial that he exchanged letters with his Israeli counterpart. But the Obama administration, for its own equally understandable reasons, also needs him to come out of the closet. Unfortunately for Mursi, his first visit to Washington will come shortly before the American presidential elections, meaning that the American-Egyptian-Israeli triangle will be a news item in the American media, at least for a few days.

Obama will probably encourage Mursi to be more open about his orientation, maybe by visiting a staunch pro-Israel institute as the Tunisian Al-Nahda Party leader Rachid Al-Ghannouchi did on his first visit to Washington after the Islamists' victory in Tunisia. Obama would appreciate such a gesture if for no other reason than to thwart Republican Party attacks that accuse him of letting down an erstwhile ally and of himself being a Muslim. This sounds like a fair price for the Obama administration's recognition of Mursi, despite the irregularities that marred the Egyptian elections, such as the repeated threats of violence if Mursi lost, his supporters' sectarian propaganda, and the prevention of Christians in some areas from voting. Furthermore, the administration did not protest against Mursi's assuming both the executive and legislative powers in Egypt, which flies in the face of the principle of checks and balances. So, will Mursi acquiesce, or will he hide behind a beard?

The United States courted the Brotherhood even before Mubarak's fall. But it takes two to tango. So far the Brotherhood has been happy to let America lead, while trying to create the impression, especially at home, that it is seeking new dance partners during four and 36-hour visits to Tehran and Beijing, respectively. Will it manage to keep up this image for long? It seems doubtful. Mursi's aides should make sure they pack his favourite dancing shoes, as all eyes will be turned on him when he makes his first appearance in Washington later this month.

The writer is a political analyst.

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