Mursi and Israel

Regardless of events in Sinai, sooner or later Egypt's new president will be obliged to be unequivocal on his stance on Israel, an issue he has so far avoided, writes Khalil El-Anani

The attack on Egyptian soldiers in Rafah two weeks ago has thrown into relief a subject that has largely been unmentioned and unmentionable since the revolution: Egypt's foreign policy towards Israel. Regardless of who carried out that attack, it constituted a challenge to -- and a qualitative violation of -- Egyptian sovereignty, perhaps the first on such a scale since the 1970s. Sadly, the incident demonstrated that the Egyptian foreign policy compass is fixed on a reactive rather than a proactive stance, complete with strategic forecasting and scenario analysis. In addition, since taking office over a month ago, President Mohamed Mursi has been uninvolved in (or perhaps kept uninvolved in) the foreign policy affairs pertaining to the relationship with Tel Aviv to which, like it or not, Egypt is bound by a peace treaty, however we might disagree over its substance and articles.

Admittedly, Mursi is not in an enviable position with respect to this question. First, he cannot initiate a radical change in Egyptian policy towards Israel, at least during the current phase. The parameters governing this relationship have been and remain a key function of Egyptian intelligence, while the president has served to steer foreign policy guidelines, rather than to execute them. In addition, no one -- not the president, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) -- can afford the political costs of instituting a change in Egyptian policy towards Israel. As much as the Egyptian people may hate the Hebrew entity, they would oppose the option of military confrontation, especially if forced upon them in a certain ideological dressing. Egypt is not Iran and the Muslim Brothers are not the mullahs.

Second, Mursi is still caught between two formidable restraints: the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand and SCAF on the other. Even if he wanted, he could not take an independent policy towards Israel, whether positive or negative. His strong connection with the Muslim Brotherhood clearly exercises a strong influence on his domestic policy and it is likely to have an equally heavy influence on his foreign policy, if not now then soon. At the same time, Mursi cannot jeopardise his relationship with SCAF, at least at present, by pursuing a policy that deviates from the conventions of the military establishment, which favour strategic caution and tactical "patience" in dealing with Tel Aviv.

Third, it is difficult to imagine that Egyptian public opinion will put up for long with President Mursi's non-commitment to an explicit position on Israel. People will begin to regard him as hiding his head in the sand. Sooner or later, he will have to take an unequivocal stance, not just because of the peace treaty but also because the Israeli army is poised at our eastern gateway, which presents a serious potential threat to Egypt's national security. Israel will not regard the peace treaty as an impediment to using the border issue as a pressure card against Mursi on any number of issues, not least of which are Egypt's relationship with Hamas and its position on Iran. We should bear in mind that Israeli forces have breached Egyptian borders on several occasions during the passed three decades on various pretexts and have killed many Egyptian soldiers in the process.

Yet, it is unlikely that Mursi would shift Egypt onto an overtly antagonistic footing with Israel in keeping with the outlook of the ideological group to which he belongs. In spite of the Muslim Brotherhood's anti-Israeli hostility, which, with some members, reaches the degree of refusing to recognise the existence of that state, the Muslim Brothers cannot go against the general mood of the Egyptian public which would oppose a confrontation with Israel on the basis of a Brotherhood agenda. Probably the most that that group can push for is to furnish as much support as possible to Hamas in Gaza. Indeed, this explains why Mursi ordered the Rafah border crossing to be kept open permanently and allowed Palestinians from Gaza to enter Egypt without visas or entry permits. As humanitarian as these decisions were, in my opinion, they should have been given better thought with regard to how to apply them so as avert the negative consequences that would mar Egyptian-Palestinian relations, as occurred following the criminal attack against the Egyptian army that is said to have been carried out by Palestinian and Egyptian jihadist elements.

In short, Mursi should bring himself to acknowledge the bitter truth. Dealing with Israel is not an option. It is an imperative dictated by Egyptian interests. The longer he puts off recognising this fact and the longer he keeps his government's position in the grey zone, the more complications this will cause for Egypt's foreign policy. Mursi does not have to accept Israeli conditions for the realisation of a peace treaty with the Palestinians. However, he should develop a clear vision for how to manage the relationship with Tel Aviv, at least from the strategic and security perspective, if not from the political one, and he should inform the public of this vision.

Towards the formulation of such a vision, he would be well advised to engage two instruments. The first is to form a non-partisan presidential advisory committee consisting of experts on the Israeli question, which is a complex national security issue with numerous and diverse domestic and foreign ramifications. The committee should include former diplomats, military and intelligence experts, and scholars with demonstrable expertise on the matter. Egypt has no shortage of such experts so the creation of such a committee merely awaits a presidential initiative. The second instrument would be an Egyptian-Palestinian council or joint committee that would focus on all the outstanding issues between the two sides (border controls, security coordination, regulating economic, commercial and cultural relations, etc). Such a body would serve not only to quell commotion over the special relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, it would also avert situations that would cause the Palestinians to lose Egyptian support. I do not believe there would be a serious obstacle to acting on this proposal either, as long as the political will exists.

The writer is researcher at School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University.

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Victories of the FSA

As the rebel Free Syrian Army grows in size and firepower, will this be the force that overthrows the Al-Assad regime, asks Bassel Oudat in Damascus The funeral of a man whose name was given only as "Mansour" who was killed in anti-government fighting in Homs, Syria

While Syria's political opposition was debating whether to take up arms to help bring down the regime headed by President Bashar Al-Assad, or remain a peaceful movement, the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) was growing in size and firepower on the ground, spreading throughout the country like a spider's web. Its ranks have been swelling with new members, and its operations are more sophisticated and its weaponry is improving, allowing it to take the lead over the country's bickering political opposition.

The FSA is essentially comprised of defectors from the regular Syrian army and a fair number of civilian volunteers. According to the Syrian opposition, it now controls 60 per cent of inhabited regions in Syria, and its firepower was showcased during battles in the northern city of Aleppo recently, where it was able to take control of more than 60 per cent of the city within days.

This control has been maintained for more than 20 days, and so far the regular army has been unable to eject FSA fighters, despite its superior numbers and equipment.

"There are more than 25,000 fighters in Aleppo," Omar Barakat, an FSA officer in Aleppo, told Al-Ahram Weekly. "About 90 per cent of them are military personnel who have defected, supported by hundreds of volunteers. It will be difficult for the regular army to overpower them because the FSA has prepared well for the type of urban warfare going on in Aleppo. Since Aleppo's rural areas and as far as the Turkish border are now under FSA control, arms supplies can reach it without much trouble."

Such arms include not only Kalashnikovs and M-60s, but also shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft weapons delivered in August, possibly tipping the balance in favour of the FSA.

There are no exact figures regarding the size of the FSA, but estimates suggest that it has between 50,000 and 120,000 fighters and no central command. Regional military councils try to stay in touch and are connected to the FSA's supreme military council, though the FSA is less like a coherent body and more like a large number of individual armed battalions operating under the umbrella of the Syrian revolution.

While these battalions are united in their goals and commitment, they lack coordination amongst themselves. They began by protecting peaceful demonstrations against the regime and ended by forming military brigades intent on liberating Syria when it became clear that the regime would not back down from its security policies.

However, the FSA's military operations have been hamstrung by its still small size and its lack of weapons when compared to the regular Syrian army with its tanks, combat helicopters, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, security forces and militias.

Nonetheless, the longer the uprising lasts the more organised the FSA is becoming, with its ranks being swelled with civilian volunteers. According to armed revolutionary sources, it consists of 150 armed battalions operating under a variety of labels, whether Islamist, historical, or named after martyrs killed during the uprising.

Some of these battalions have joined forces to form larger brigades, and they are generally divided into the four categories of military battalions, Islamist battalions, civilian battalions, and battalions grouped around local tribal identities.

The military battalions are mostly made up of officers and other elements that have defected from the ranks of the army or security services. They are small groups that resort to militia warfare and rely on supplies they capture from the regular army and regime militias, or on what defectors bring with them when they flee.

Some of these groups are under the control of the military council chaired by Mustafa Al-Sheikh, while others are commanded by opposition leader Riyad Al-Asaad. They mostly operate individually in separate regions and coordinate amongst themselves for broader operations.

Some Western countries have said that they are supporting these battalions by sending them advanced communications equipment to help enhance their coordination, but military sources deny this, wanting what they call "real assistance and not just lip service".

There are two types of Islamist battalions, the first being those loyal to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, such as the Al-Farouq Battalion fighting in the central city of Homs. These are assisted by Syrian Islamist groups outside the country and by Arab states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, their weaponry being smuggled in from Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.

These Islamist battalions coordinate with military battalions on major operations, but prefer to remain independent in their strategic decisions.

The second type of Islamist battalion is the Salafist battalions such as Al-Ansar, which also operates in Homs. These battalions consist of small armed groups that move independently and refuse to cooperate or follow the command of the military battalions, receiving funds and weapons from Syrian Salafist movements and Salafist movements in Arab countries.

The civilian battalions are located inside and on the periphery of Syria's cities, and they mostly consist of civilian young people and rely on the local community for funding. The members of these battalions are not experienced fighters, and they usually try to protect districts and civilians in villages and small towns. They have been accused of resorting to extortion to secure funds, as they have no clear source of funds.

The tribal battalions are mainly found in Deir Al-Zur near the border with Iraq, and they are made up of members of local tribes that have always carried arms and have now turned on the regime after the latter destroyed their towns and villages.

These battalions rely on logistical and military assistance from the tribes in the region, and they are generally incapable of organised warfare and are inexperienced in strategy. Many of their members were killed before the arrival of the FSA to help them organise their ranks.

Meanwhile, defecting Kurdish soldiers and civilian volunteers have also formed military battalions in northeast Syria under the name of Salaheddin Al-Ayoubi, consolidating their operations under the banner of the Free Kurdish Army. These battalions are funded by Kurdish businessmen and are supplied by weapons from military battalions.

The regime has tried to manipulate the disorganisation of the armed opposition by creating its own battalions under the banner of the FSA. These move covertly among the people, stirring up mayhem in order to turn local people against the FSA.

All the FSA battalions use militia-warfare strategies to inflict the greatest possible damage on forces loyal to the regime, but they have not thus far scored any lasting victories since they are out-powered by regime forces.

They therefore resort to hit-and-run operations, withdrawing from areas that are under siege and being pummeled by artillery fire and then returning once the bombardment stops.

Over the past few months, the FSA has captured dozens of tanks, armoured vehicles, heavy guns, and anti-aircraft guns from regime forces, and these have helped it to cause immense damage to the regular army.

More than 20,000 personnel from the regular army and security and militia forces have been killed, and more than 600 tanks and some 500 armoured vehicles and military trucks have been damaged or destroyed. Seven helicopters have been sabotaged or shot down.

Some FSA leaders are located in Turkey, while others are inside Syria. Many observers believe that financial, military and technological assistance sent to the FSA is being processed through mediators who distribute supplies among those battalions closest to them physically or ideologically in order to strengthen their footholds inside the country or as leverage to force other battalions to come under their control.

Last week, the armed opposition took a significant step towards unity when prominent battalions promised to respect human rights in their battle to overthrow the regime and not to allow rape, torture or the killing of prisoners, upholding the respect for human rights in compliance with the principles of Islam and international law.

The commitments were made by battalions in Deraa, Deir Al-Zur, Homs and Aleppo, though other fighters refused to sign on to them.

Last month, the US administration, which has not wanted to arm the Syrian opposition directly, sought to allow Syrians overseas to collect funds to pay the thousands of fighters and buy weapons and ammunition.

These overseas groups promised not to fund opposition leaders who had not committed themselves to a future democratic state that would include all Syrians and had rejected terrorism and extremism. They plan to collect donations worth $7 million a month to arm the Syrian opposition.

The popularity of the FSA has been climbing among protesters against the Al-Assad regime, and its members mostly operate in a friendly environment that assists and gives them refuge.

However, they have not been welcomed by the political opposition forces, which are worried that the FSA will grow too big and mayhem could break out when the regime falls, given the lack of central control.

When the regime decided to crackdown on the protesters in an attempt to halt the Syrian uprising, it could not have imagined the number of defections that would follow. Neither could it have imagined that the people would form an army to fight against the regular army, one whose ranks have been swelling by the day despite the immediate public execution of anyone deserting the army or security forces.

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Exit SCAF, enter Mursi

After six weeks in office Egypt's first civilian president has sidelined the military, forcing it to leave the political arena it controlled for six decades. What are the likely ramifications, asks Amira Howeidy

When the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a constitutional addendum on 17 June -- the final day of the presidential election runoffs -- clipping the future president's wings while giving the military exceptional powers, it was clear that Egypt was in the throes of a power struggle. It was also clear that -- for the time being, at least -- the army had the upper hand.

SCAF annulled parliament, claimed legislative powers, control of the budget and constituent assembly and formed a defence council dominated by generals to oversee military affairs. When the Brotherhood's uncharismatic Mohamed Mursi -- the group's back-up candidate for the presidential elections -- finally emerged the victor, he was forced to swear his oath of office before the Mubarak-appointed Supreme Constitutional Court.

The president's weakness was underscored by the overweening presence of SCAF's head, 76-year-old Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. Mursi may have won the election but he was sharing the office of president. A hostile media campaign against Mursi only reinforced this impression.

On Sunday 12 August the "puppet" president turned the tables, much more quickly than Mursi's most optimistic backers had dared to hope. Tantawi was forced into retirement, along with SCAF's deputy chief Sami Anan. After two decades as the military's strong man Tantawi was replaced by SCAF member Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, the 57-year-old head of military intelligence. Eight SCAF members were moved in the reshuffle.

Mursi also appointed a vice president.

Mahmoud Mekki, 58, the former head of the Court of Cassation, was a leading figure in the 2005-2006 campaign for greater judicial independence that had proved such a thorn in the side of the Mubarak regime.

To top it all, Mursi issued a constitutional addendum of his own which not only cancelled the military's 17 June supplementary declaration but allocated the powers SCAF had granted itself to the president.

On Tuesday Mursi continued his reshuffle of the military by naming new commanders of air defence, naval and air forces.

Mursi had pulled off a soft-coup. The legitimacy he has accrued by virtue of being elected democratically had proved stronger than many analysts thought. Strong enough, certainly, to allow Egypt's first non-military president to exercise his authority in a direction that is reshaping the bases of the Egyptian state.

"One of the most significant elements of a modern democratic civilian state has been established," says military expert and former senior intelligence officer Safwat El-Zayat. "Do not underestimate the importance of the new minister of defence's salute before the civilian president who appointed him."

Many SCAF members may remain on the scene, adds El-Zayat, but it's only a matter of time before public pressure corrects that.

"We're still in a transitional phase. Radical changes won't happen overnight but the ball is rolling and it can't be stopped."

While it is far from clear how the new constitution will define the relationship between the military and the state, El-Zayat predicts it will place military-civilian relations in a far "healthier" balance.

Rabab El-Mahdi, one of a handful of Egyptian experts on military-civilian relations, offers a more cautious reading. The military may no longer be governing directly, she says, but their engagement in politics is far from over.

"There's still a strong military presence in senior civilian positions and the military retains its economic power base. It still constitutes a major centre of power."

Mursi's move came a week after gunmen killed 16 Egyptian border guards in Rafah. The attack initially appeared to damage Mursi. He was accused of allowing his ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is close to Hamas, to sway his judgement, downgrading security at the Rafah border crossing with Gaza and allowing Palestinian militants easy entry to Sinai. While no evidence has emerged to identify the assailants -- it was destroyed by the Israeli missiles that killed the attackers -- the mainstream media and SCAF were quick to claim Palestinian involvement. The tide against Mursi was so high it was deemed unsafe for him to attend the funeral of the border guards. When his prime minister, Hisham Qandil, turned up at the funeral prayers he was attacked by a shoe-throwing mob.

Things began to change when general intelligence chief Mourad Mowafi revealed both the intelligence services and the army had been warned of the attack. Mursi responded by sacking Mowafi, the governor of North Sinai, the head of the Republican Guard and Hamdi Badin, the head of military police. The dismissals did little to contain growing unease over the military's failure to prevent the attack. Tantawi's subsequent decision to launch a major offensive in Sinai, involving the bombing of alleged terrorist strongholds, also failed to assuage the public outcry.

It was against this backdrop that Mursi made his move against Tantawi and the military's elite.

The "balance of power", says El-Mahdi, had tilted in Mursi's favour and he was "shrewd enough" to use it.

The details of how Mursi orchestrated his coup are unlikely to emerge in the public domain. That there was no response from the military to the dismissals suggests Mursi acted with the support of senior officers. His promotion of El-Sisi to replace Tantawi was an astute move, since in his role as head of military intelligence he will know all the skeletons in the military's cupboard.

Mursi clearly used disagreements within SCAF over the transitional period in his favour, and his powers of patronage -- awarding prestigious promotions -- appear to have been enough to secure the support of at least half of the military council's members.

Important questions, though, remain unanswered.

Were Mursi's moves as closely linked to the Rafah border attack as their timing suggests?

A story published Wednesday in the Israeli daily Haaretz claims Mursi dismissed the generals to pre-empt a military coup planned for August. While the story conspicuously failed to provide any evidence for its assertions it feeds into the mystery surrounding the sackings.

And how closely was the Muslim Brotherhood involved in Mursi's coup?

If no one is holding their breath waiting for credible revelations of what actually went on between Mursi and Tantawi, they expect even less to emerge about the role of the Brotherhood.

Commentators describe the Brotherhood's decision-making process, believed to be dominated by Khairat El-Shater, as the group's black box. It is shrouded in mystery.

More than a year after it was formed the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party's (FJP) links with the group remain vague. So too is the relationship between Mursi and both the Brotherhood and FJP.

Mursi may have been able to use his legitimacy as elected president to dismiss the generals but such political capital comes with a sell-by-date. Without clearing up persistent questions about the influence of the Brotherhood over the presidency -- and that requires a commitment to transparency no one seems keen to embrace -- it may expire sooner than anyone supposes.

Traces of Brotherhood influence can be found in Mursi's decision to name Mahmoud Mekki as his deputy, after appointing his brother, judge Ahmed Mekki, as minister of justice. The Brotherhood has long fetishised judges, approaching several in the hope one might agree to run as the group's presidential candidate. Ahmed Mekki is rumoured to have originally accepted the Brotherhood's offer only to change his mind.

The Mekki brothers' appointments have been welcomed by many political forces on the strength of the leading role both played in pressing for greater judicial independence. On Tuesday Ahmed Mekki began moves to transfer the supervision of judges from his ministry to the Supreme Judicial Council, a huge step towards freeing the judiciary from executive control.

Mursi emerged this week with his power consolidated. There is no longer a military to blame for any ensuing disaster. It is now up to the elected president to deal with Mubarak's ugly legacy. He will be judged on how far he succeeds.

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Not exactly a coup, but almost

The decision by President Mursi to defang the military was sudden as it was decisive, reports Ahmed Eleiba

Triggered by events in Rafah, President Mohamed Mursi took a daring step that ended the power struggle between him and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and dashed any hopes by the military to hang on to power.

A key figure in the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the recent decisions by the president eradicated the presence of the so-called "deep state" in Egypt.

Former defence minister Hussein Tantawi and former chief of staff Sami Anan will be given honorary medals and posts in the presidential team, but will have no real power from now on, according to the FJP source. As for the possibility of legal action against the two men or other members of the SCAF, the source dismissed it, saying that the president wants a face-saving exit for the SCAF.

Military analysts say that most of the errors committed by the SCAF were unintentional, caused mostly by inexperience and the unusual circumstances the country was passing through in the wake of the revolution which toppled Hosni Mubarak as president.

According to some political analysts, the SCAF was not as politicised as the Revolutionary Command Council of 1952. It was only a caretaking council running things according to a timetable for the handover of power. Or at least this is how things started.

In the early statements of the SCAF, it was clear that it had no political ambitions. But eventually the SCAF turned into an active political player, as the recent supplementary constitutional amendment illustrates.

The recent constitutional declaration, says military expert Safwat El-Zayat, was the SCAF's biggest mistake.

The SCAF alienated everyone, young revolutionaries just as veteran politicians, says Ahmed Abd Rabbu, a member of the now disbanded Youths of the Revolution Coalition:

"Today we can say that the SCAF is really out of power. The SCAF lost the support of the revolutionaries who went out in demonstrations to ask for its removal and trial. Even the Brotherhood, which initially coordinated with the SCAF, turned against it. This is because the SCAF tried to put together the tattered remains of the Mubarak regime. It lost public support because of what happened in Mohamed Mahmoud Street, the cabinet, Maspero, and Abbasiya events," Abd Rabbu adds. These Cairo areas all involved deadly street battles.

El-Zayat agrees with this assessment. "We have to compare two scenes, one on 11 February 2011, when the demonstrators were shouting that the army and the people were one hand, and one a few weeks ago, when they were calling for the end of military rule. The SCAF was packed with people who should have retired at least 20 years ago. But they stayed on, adding to the ossification of the state and acting as if some of the state's institutions were above the law. The top brass were duped by some members of the elite who made them believe that they could stay longer in power, even when everyone at home and abroad wanted them to leave. You may have noticed that US spokesperson Victoria Nuland said that Washington knew of the changes at the top of the military beforehand. What does this tell you?"

Tantawi, El-Zayat says, lost his chance for an honourable mention in the history records. By October 2011, when tanks rolled over the bodies of innocent civilians, the SCAF was already part of the problem, he points out.

The SCAF, one may argue, should have left power the moment the president was sworn in. But it stayed put, perhaps because it felt that the Muslim Brotherhood was poised to hijack the state's institution, including the army.

Military analyst Talaat Musallam says that the SCAF did not have political ambitions in the beginning, but only a timetable to hand over power right after a president takes office and the constitution is written. But once Mursi was in office, a power struggle surfaced.

"The SCAF wanted to stay in power, however partially, until the constitution was written. But the president had other plans, which he made clear in his speeches in the Constitutional Court, Tahrir Square and Cairo University. Also, his attempt to reconvene the parliament rubbed the SCAF the wrong way. Tantawi and Anan were prepared to leave power on 30 June, but they decided to stay put, thinking that this was the right thing to do. But this was just as bad a move as a lot of their earlier decisions during the interim period. Still, they didn't want the differences to become public. But there was no turning back at this point, so the president used the Rafah incident against them. The Sinai situation was terrible. For the first time ever the Egyptian army was attacked by Egyptians. The error, in my opinion, was committed by two junior officers and an army unit that failed to take defensive measures. The statements of general intelligence chief Mourad Mowafi were valid, but they rubbed the president the wrong way," Musallam notes.

Military expert Adel Suleiman says that the time of military coups is over. The international community is against the military taking power anywhere.

"I came back from a military trip to the Pakistani-Afghan borders a few weeks ago. I found that many of the Jihadist members of Al-Qaeda have a far-reaching communication network with their comrades in neighbouring countries, and they benefited from the poor security in the countries of the Arab Spring. So the military should have left power instead of engaging in political debates which ended with the army getting dragged into the quagmire of Sinai. We need new leaders and new plans so that the country may emerge from its dire straits. The old leaders who have been around for decades should have stepped down to allow new blood to come along," Suleiman adds.

News of a SCAF plan to stage a coup against the president alarmed MB members, who still deny prior knowledge of Mursi's plans to dismiss Tantawi and Anan. But the president pre-empted the coup. His top aides say that his first trip to Rafah left him in a bad mood and that he felt even worse after the second trip, when he saw that the security measures were less than satisfactory.

The president decided that sharing power with the SCAF was not going to lead anywhere. According to a senior MB source, the president met with Counsellor Mahmoud Mekki and Ambassador Mohamed Refaa. The three men decided to issue a new constitutional declaration abrogating the last declaration by the SCAF. The wording of the decision was kept so secret that the presidential spokesman was reading the statement out on television without rehearsing it in advance.

Musallam says that no one should even talk about a coup or listen to what the MB is saying about the involvement of Tantawi and Anan in the Rafah events. He dismisses as untrue claims by MB members that the security negligence in Sinai was planned to undermine the president's authority.

According to El-Zayat, the most likely scenario is that the SCAF knew that its days in power were limited and that the visits to Egypt by US secretaries Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta made it clear that the military would not be allowed to hold on to power. This was a matter of agreement between Mursi and army commanders who had strong links with the US, including the new Defence Minister Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi.

An MB source denies prior agreement with the Americans, but admits that US officials knew what was about to happen.

"The president has his own men in the SCAF and he received certain messages suggesting that the SCAF was trying to get him in trouble. I believe that El-Sisi played a role in passing on this kind of messages and that he was the point man who persuaded SCAF members, especially Tantawi and Anan, to accept the new situation and leave without making a fuss. The impressive record of El-Sisi in the army and his popularity among various army officers of all ranks played in his favour, and it is unlikely that anyone will challenge his authority," the source says.

The subsequent coordination with Washington was routine because the US involvement in the army on the levels of finance and logistics is substantial.

"Anan and Tantawi didn't have much of a choice," the MB source states.

El-Zayat offers his own take on the showdown: "The SCAF didn't plan to stage a coup against an elected president, but could have engineered events that undermine the president and initiate the kind of turbulence that may allow the SCAF to return to power. But the SCAF was not impenetrable, and El-Sisi's ties with the president made it easy for the latter to act," El-Zayat says.

The Tantawi-led SCAF is over. And a new SCAF is not being formed by new military leaders, with El-Sisi making sure that the new SCAF will have no interest in politics, according to Musallam.

Both El-Zayat and Musallam agree that El-Sisi and his second in command, Chief of Staff Sobhi Sidqi, may not keep their jobs for long. Once they get things under control in Sinai, a major restructuring of the Ministry of Defence will begin.

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Back to revolution?

Yemen's prime minister calls for a return to the street, but few are listening, writes Nasser Arrabyee

The Yemeni prime minister of the national unity government, Mohamed Basundawa, has called for a return to "revolution" after nine months of political settlement.

Basundawa accused the former regime of thwarting the political settlement that was based on a Saudi-led and US-backed Gulf deal, known as the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Initiative.

In an article written in a Saudi newspaper this week, Basundawa, who is also the chairman of the National Council of the Revolution Forces, called for renouncing the GCC Initiative and returning to the squares to continue the "revolution".

Such statements sparked much criticism on Basundawa, who has seemed weak and unable to take national responsibility for rescuing Yemen from chaos.

"This is just political extortion. Basundawa wants to extort the sponsors of the GCC Initiative; he wants them to side with him against the other parties," said Mohamed Al-Makaleh, a political analyst.

Al-Makaleh said Basundawa should resign if he cannot continue as prime minister. "But I think he does not want to resign, he only wants Qatar and Saudi Arabia to side with him," he said.

The Yemeni Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakul Karman called upon Basundawa to resign.

"Because we respect Mr Basundawa, we want him to resign immediately as long as he cannot do his job," said Karman.

Karman and Al-Makaleh, respectively, are leading members in the Islamist and socialist parties, the largest parties in the six-party coalition that shares in government with the party of the former regime, the People's General Congress (PGC).

The PGC, which controls 50 per cent in the Basundawa government, is also accusing Basundawa of obstructing the political settlement. The party accuses him of implementing the instructions of influential tribal and religious leaders in the Islamist Party, which is trying to dominate the political scene.

"The People's General Congress has been implementing the GCC Initiative unilaterally, while the other parties have been doing everything possible to obstruct it," said Aref Al-Zuka, assistant secretary-general of the party.

The controversial statements of Basundawa that were first published in a Saudi newspaper came one day before President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi paid a visit to Saudi Arabia to attend an urgent Islamic summit and discuss the Yemeni political and economic situation with the Saudi monarch.

President Hadi is expected to explain to the Saudi leadership that Yemen needs urgent assistance and that donors and friends of Yemen should not wait longer.

FRIENDS OF YEMEN: A high-level "consultative group" meeting for the "Friends of Yemen" will be held in Riyadh on 4-5 September. The meeting precedes the fourth gathering of the Friends of Yemen and the upcoming second donor conference, both to be held in New York on 27 September.

The meetings will coincide with the deliberations of the 67th UN General Assembly. The Riyadh meetings will lay the foundation for the upcoming New York meetings, which are expected to raise aid for Yemen.

On 4-5 September, Yemen's ministry of planning and international cooperation will co-chair a meeting with Saudi Arabia's finance ministry and the World Bank Group. The 4 September meeting will be devoted to bilateral and international donors. The meeting of 5 September will be devoted to the private sector, humanitarian and non-governmental organisations.

Senior representatives of the Friends of Yemen group will also meet in New York on 27 September to assess progress of the democratic transition process and address obstacles facing its implementation. Friends of Yemen have expressed on numerous occasions their political commitment to supporting President Hadi and the national unity government.

The Friends of Yemen meeting will also coincide with the Yemen Donor Conference. Representatives of more than 30 multilateral donors, governments, businesses and non-governmental organisations will attend the New York conference to address Yemen's worsening humanitarian and economic crisis.

The global forum will discuss the transitional programme for stabilisation and development in Yemen. Donors are expected to announce additional funding to support Yemen's transition process, addressing both short and long-term development needs. In addition, the conference will re-energise the delivery of previous aid pledges.

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